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Rumination has been shown to be an influential part of the depressive experience, impacting on various 
cognitive processes including memory and attention. However, there is a dearth of studies examining 
the relationship between rumination and emotion recognition, deficits or biases in which have been 
closely linked to a depressive mood state. In Study 1, participants (N = 89) received either a rumination 
or distraction induction prior to completing three variants of an emotion recognition task assessing 
decoding accuracy or biases. Results demonstrated that greater levels of dysphoria were associated with 
poorer facial emotion recognition accuracy, but only when participants were induced to ruminate (as 
opposed to being induced to distract). The aim of Study 2 (N = 172) was to examine a possible 
mechanism, namely cognitive load, by which rumination affects emotion recognition. Results from this 
study indicated that participants endorsing greater levels of dysphoria were less accurate on an emotion 
recognition task when they received either a rumination induction or a cognitive load task compared to 
their counterparts who received a distraction induction. Importantly, the performance of those in the 
cognitive load and rumination conditions did not differ from each other. In summary, these findings 
suggest that the confluence of dysphoria and rumination can influence individuals’ accuracy in 
identifying emotional content portrayed in facial expressions. Furthermore, rumination, by definition an 
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Dysphoria and facial emotion recognition: Examining the role of rumination 
 Nolen-Hoeksema’s (1987) responses style theory of depression has been very influential in 
explaining the etiology and course of depression. This theory posits that the manner with which we 
respond to dysphoric mood can impact the development and duration of a depressive episode. The 
theory focuses specifically on the response style, rumination, which is conceptualized as a mood 
regulation process which involves an inward focus on the possible causes and implications of one’s 
current mood state and is viewed as maladaptive. Studies that examine the various effects of 
rumination typically compare it to an alternative response style, distraction. In contrast to rumination, 
distraction involves an outward focus on pleasant or neutral thoughts or actions. A recent review of the 
rumination literature (Thomsen, 2006) concluded that rumination does, indeed, have a negative effect 
on depressed mood and that greater levels of rumination are associated with greater declines in affect 
(Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990). Furthermore, people differ with respect to their tendency to 
ruminate in response to their depressed mood (Nolen-Hoeksema, Morrow, & Fredrickson, 1993).  Those 
who exhibit a ruminative response style have a greater risk of becoming depressed, and their depressive 
episodes tend to last longer and be more severe compared to those who have a tendency to use 
distraction in response to their low mood (e.g., Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema et 
al., 1993; Nolen-Hoeksema, Parker, & Larson, 1994).  
 As many studies have established a link between rumination and depression, researchers have 
begun to investigate the effects of rumination on depression-related cognitive biases. The overarching 
aim of the current set of studies is to examine the possible role of rumination in the relationship 
between depressed mood and facial emotion recognition. First, I will review studies that have linked 
rumination with various cognitive processes. Second, I will discuss a specific cognitive process, emotion 




relationship between depression and emotion recognition. Finally, I will examine the existing evidence 
which suggests that rumination can have an impact on emotion recognition.  
 Both of the research studies I conducted as part of this program of research were based on 
samples of non-patient, dysphoric individuals (i.e., those who report mild-to-moderate levels of 
depressive symptomatology). Interestingly, the bulk of the emotion recognition literature has focused 
mainly on clinically depressed individuals whereas the rumination literature was built on studies 
employing dysphoric samples. Of course, emotion recognition studies using a dysphoric sample (e.g., 
Frewen & Dozois, 2005; Persad & Polivy, 1993) and rumination studies using a depressed sample (e.g., 
Donaldson & Lam, 2004; Joorman, Dkane, & Gotlib, 2006; Raes, Hermans, & Williams, 2006) have been 
conducted but they are in the relative minority. Although some theorists argue otherwise (e.g., Coyne & 
Downey, 1991), the generally accepted conceptualization is that depression is dimensional in nature 
rather than categorical (e.g., Fergusson et al., 2005; Flett, Vredenburg, & Krames, 1997; Halberstadt et 
al., 2008; Lahey et al., 2008; Okumura, Sakamoto, Tomoda, & Kijima, 2009; Vredenburg, Flett, & Krames, 
1993). Analogue studies which focus on dysphoric participants are informative of phenomena in 
individuals with greater symptom severity and vice versa. Thus, I will review both studies that employ 
dysphoric samples as well as those that use clinical samples. Furthermore, individuals with subclinically 
elevated depressive symptoms are at increased risk for later development of Major Depressive Disorder 
(Fergusson et al., 2005) and other negative outcomes such as substance abuse (Lewinsohn, Solomon, 
Seely, & Zeiss, 2000). Thus, gaining a greater understanding of individuals with subthreshold depression 
symptoms would serve to inform the development of intervention and prevention protocols. 
Rumination and Cognitive Processes  
On the surface, rumination seems as if it should be an effective strategy to lift one’s spirits. 
There is an intuitive appeal to sitting down and analyzing one’s current situation to pinpoint the reasons 




low mood, rumination typically results in a paradoxical exacerbation of one’s negative mood. This 
unintended consequence is thought to occur via rumination’s effect on various other cognitive 
processes (e.g., Hertel, 1998; Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Sutherland & Bryant, 2007; 
Watkins & Baracaia, 2002). For example, dysphoric ruminators (i.e., individuals who tend to employ 
rumination in response to a negative mood) are more pessimistic about the probability of future positive 
events (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995), the severity of their own problems, and the efficacy of 
their proposed solutions to their problems (Lyubomirsky, Tucker, Caldwell, & Berg, 1999). Dysphoric 
participants who are randomly assigned to a rumination condition are also more likely to spontaneously 
discuss their current difficulties (Lyubomirsky et al., 1999), and, in general, display a more negative 
cognitive style, such as holding maladaptive attitudes towards evaluation, performance standards, and 
expectations for control (Spasojevic & Alloy, 2001).  
In addition to pessimistic predictions and general negativity, rumination also appears to affect 
other cognitive processes. For example, dysphoric participants who are induced to ruminate are more 
likely to recall negative autobiographical memories (Lyubomirsky, Caldwell, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998) 
and the details of their autobiographical memories tend to be more vague and lacking in detail 
(Sutherland & Bryant, 2007). Furthermore, dysphoric ruminators exhibit an attentional bias to sad faces 
(Joorman et al., 2006) and a negative bias in their interpretation of schematic facial emotions (Raes et 
al., 2006) and hypothetical events (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Lyubomirsky et al., 1999). 
Thus, for dysphoric individuals, rumination appears to have a pervasive effect on cognition, affecting a 
variety of cognitive processes.     
As mentioned previously, distraction is typically employed as a foil to rumination. In the 
aforementioned studies that used an experimental induction methodology, distraction as well as 
rumination was induced in participants. Whereas rumination serves to maintain dysphoric mood, 




Sigmon, 1999). Distraction is proposed to redirect attention away from the ruminative process and, 
thus, frees up cognitive resources to pursue more enjoyable and/or productive activities (Tse & Bond, 
2004). Indeed, dysphoric participants who receive a distraction induction typically perform similarly to 
control participants (i.e., non-dysphoric or non-depressed) who receive either a distraction or 
rumination induction (e.g., Hertel & El-Messidi, 2006; Lyubomirsky et al., 1998; Lyubomirsky, Kasri, & 
Zehm, 2003; Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995).    
 While impairments or biases in cognitive processes have long been linked to depression, the 
aforementioned studies suggest that rumination might be the mechanism underlying these relationships 
(see Figure 1 for a schematic representation). Rumination appears to have a negative effect on these 
processes but it is important to note that theorists are divided with respect to whose processing should 
be affected by rumination. Some researchers believe that this effect should occur only for dysphoric 
individuals. Indeed, some studies that employ a response style induction (i.e., rumination vs. distraction) 
have found that control participants’ performance is comparable across both inductions and dysphoric 
or depressed participants who receive a distraction induction perform similarly to the control group 
(e.g., Lyubomirsky et al., 1998; Lyubomirsky et al., 2003; Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995). This 
pattern of results could be interpreted to mean either that the rumination induction has a negative 
effect on dysphoric participants or that the distraction induction has a positive effect. A study which 
included a non-induction condition (i.e., participants were instructed to think about anything they 
wanted during the induction phase) found evidence in favour of the latter interpretation (Hertel, 1998). 
In this study, dysphoric participants who received either a rumination or no induction, but not those 
who received a distraction induction, performed significantly worse on a fragment completion task 
compared to control participants. These results suggest that distraction may be the active ingredient in 
these studies and that it serves to disrupt dysphoric individuals’ typical ruminative state. However, the 




induction procedure. While participants were instructed to think about any topic of their choosing, given 
the experimental context, the thoughts induced may not be representative of their typical thinking 
patterns.  
Results from the aforementioned studies suggest that dysphoric participants are prone to the 
effects of rumination ( Lyubomirsky et al., 1998; Lyubomirsky et al., 2003; Lyubomirsky & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1995). A related point is that the rumination induction should not affect nondysphoric 
individuals in the same manner as dysphoric individuals. That is, the rumination induction should initiate 
the ruminative process only in depressed and dysphoric individuals. Indeed, results from these studies 
are consistent with this claim and suggest that the rumination induction does not seem to ‘stick’ with 
nondysphoric participants. In other words, the ruminative process does not seem to have any impact on 
their performance on experimental tasks. 
 Whereas these studies suggest that rumination differentially affects dysphoric versus 
nondysphoric individuals, an opposing viewpoint gives greater prominence to the effects of rumination. 
According to this perspective, rumination’s influence on cognitive processing is not limited to those who 
are dysphoric. Results from studies employing a non-selected sample (i.e., participants were not 
selected or categorized according to their mood) support this hypothesis. Specifically, these studies have 
also found rumination effects using an induction methodology (e.g., Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990; 
Trask & Sigmon, 1999) or self-report measures assessing general tendencies to use rumination as a 
coping mechanism (Spasojevic & Alloy, 2001; Weinstock & Whisman, 2007). In considering both sets of 
studies, one interpretation is that rumination has the potential to affect the cognitive processing of both 
dysphoric and nondysphoric individuals. However, dysphoric individuals may be more susceptible to the 
effects of rumination, whereas nondysphoric individuals may be particularly adept at stopping the 





Depression/Dysphoria and Emotion Recognition 
 Although many studies have examined the effects of rumination on certain cognitive processes 
(e.g., autobiographical memory, attention), little attention has been paid to the relationship between 
rumination and emotion recognition. The dearth of studies examining this link is notable as emotion 
recognition is an ability that is fundamental to shaping our perceptions during interpersonal 
interactions. Due to the highly subjective nature of social interactions, various factors, including mood, 
can affect our judgments of emotional stimuli. Historically, the belief has been that depressed 
individuals view the world with a negative bias (e.g., Beck, 1967; DeMonbreun & Craighead, 1977). Their 
bias can lead them to disregard certain cues indicating warmth from others, while making them more 
attuned to negative cues that serve to reinforce their skewed outlook. Difficulties with reading the 
myriad subtle cues informing us of another person’s thoughts, feelings, and intentions place us at 
greater risk of developing a psychological disorder (Rosenthal, Hall, DiMatteo, Rogers, & Archer, 1979). 
More specifically, maladaptive biases that disrupt the ability to read social cues have been proposed to 
contribute to the development of depression (Coyne, 1976; Lewinsohn, 1974).             
 In examining the relationship between mood and emotion recognition, many researchers have 
employed emotional facial expressions (or, at least, schematic representations of emotional facial 
expressions) as stimuli. The human face is a powerful and particularly salient stimulus, with basic facial 
emotions being recognizable across many cultures (Ekman, 1992, 1994). Although a number of studies 
have been conducted with the aim of elucidating the relationship between depressed mood and facial 
emotion recognition, a consensus on the nature of this relationship has yet to be reached.  
 Several studies have found evidence suggesting that depressed individuals exhibit a pattern of 
performance on facial emotion recognition tasks that differ from their nondepressed counterparts. In 
particular, some studies have found that depressed participants displayed a mood-congruent bias, 




participants (Bouhuys, Geerts, & Gordijn, 1999; Bouhuys, Geerts, & Mersch, 1997; Gur et al., 1992; Hale, 
1998). On the other hand, other studies have demonstrated that depressed participants were poorer at 
decoding various emotions, not just negative ones. In tasks that required participants to either 
determine if the emotion displayed on two faces were similar (Asthana, Mandal, Khurana, & Haque-
Nizamie, 1998), or match a target face to a series of other faces that portrayed various emotions 
(Rubinow & Post, 1992), depressed participants exhibited poorer accuracy across all emotional valences 
compared to nondepressed control participants. These findings run counter to the idea of a negative 
bias and, instead, are suggestive of a general impairment in emotion recognition. Of note, there are also 
a few studies which do find evidence to support some sort of group difference, either an impairment or 
bias, but their pattern of results are not entirely consistent with existing theories of depression. For 
example, depressed participants have been found to have lower accuracy rates but only for identifying 
the emotions surprise (Kan, Mimura, Kamijima, & Kawamura, 2006) or anger (Mendlewicz, Linkowski, 
Bazelmans, & Philippot, 2005). Finally, not all studies have found evidence in support of depression-
related group differences. Studies that have used a recognition paradigm in which participants chose a 
response from a list of emotion words that they believed matched the target face have found no group 
differences (Frewen & Dozois, 2005; Gaebel & Wolwer, 1992; Gessler, Cutting, Frith, & Weinman, 1989). 
 Harkness, Sabbagh, Jacobson, Chowdrey, and Chen (2005) proposed that the lack of consensus 
on the relationship between depression and emotion recognition may be at least partly attributable to 
methodological shortcomings or differences. For example, some studies (e.g., Mandal & Bhattacharya, 
1985) required participants to generate their own emotion labels for the stimuli, thus involving the use 
of recall memory which has been shown to be influenced by depression (Dalgleish & Watts, 1990), and 
studies that used a recognition paradigm (e.g., Gaebel & Wolwer, 1992) often employed tasks that had 
high accuracy rates and may not have been sensitive enough to detect subtle group differences. An 




schematic drawings of faces rather than pictures of actual faces. This practice erases many of the 
complexities and nuances of the human face and, therefore, may be lacking in ecological validity.   
Using Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, and Plumb’s (2001) theory-of-mind task, Reading 
the Mind in the Eyes, both Harkness and colleagues (2005) and Lee, Harkness, Sabbagh, and Jacobson 
(2005) examined facial emotion recognition in dysphoric and depressed samples, respectively. The 
Reading the Mind in the Eyes task is comprised of cropped photographs of the eye region of people’s 
faces and employs a forced choice recognition methodology. While Lee and colleagues found that 
depressed participants were less accurate than non-depressed participants, Harkness and colleagues 
found that dysphoric participants were actually more accurate than their non-dysphoric counterparts. 
Furthermore, neither study found any evidence of a mood-related bias. The findings from these studies 
dovetail with those from the social cognition literature which propose that dysphoric individuals 
experience greater uncertainty about their environment and, thus, are consequently more motivated to 
accurately process social information in order to resolve their uncertainty (Weary & Edwards, 1994; Yost 
& Weary, 1996). Taken together, these results raise the possibility that there is a curvilinear relationship 
in which dysphoric mood is associated with enhanced emotion recognition whereas clinically depressed 
mood is associated with deficits in this same process.  
 Although the results from these studies are intriguing, it is unclear if they provide greater clarity 
to the relationship between depression/dysphoria and emotion recognition. The Reading the Mind in 
the Eyes task was designed to assess theory of mind (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). As mentioned 
previously, this task merely presents participants with the eye region of the face. However, Ekman and 
Friesen (1978) posited that facial expressions are comprised of myriad combinations of facial action 
units. That is, a particular emotion can be broken down into a specific arrangement of facial muscle 
movements. Admittedly, the eyes are disproportionately influential in determining the affective tone of 




participants are invited to infer the affective state, rather than simply recognizing it which was the intent 
of the task. Although emotion recognition and theory of mind may appear to be similar constructs, 
several theorists have proposed that they are distinct components of a broader concept, social cognition 
(Blair & Cipolotti, 2000; Joseph & Tager-Flusberg, 2004). Indeed, scores on a test of emotion recognition 
were only modestly correlated with scores on various tests of theory of mind (Dyck, Piek, Hay, Smith, & 
Hallmayer, 2006). Also, the Reading the Mind in the Eyes task successfully discriminated between 
healthy control participants and those with either Asperger’s Syndrome or high functioning autism 
whereas all three groups did not differ on a test of emotion recognition (Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, 
Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997). Furthermore, emotion recognition and theory of mind also do not 
appear to involve the same neural substrate (Shaw, Lawrence, Bramham, Brierley, Radbourne, & David, 
2007). Thus, questions of the nature of the relationship between depression/dysphoria and emotion 
recognition remain unresolved.  
Overall, the body of research suggests that that depression does have an influence on emotion 
decoding abilities (Tse & Bond, 2004) and that these findings also extend to dysphoria (Persad & Polivy, 
1993). With a few exceptions (e.g., Frewen & Dozois, 2005; Gaebel & Wolwer, 1992; Gessler et al., 
1989), on tasks assessing facial emotion recognition, depressed/dysphoric individuals typically 
performed in a manner that differed from control participants. However, what is less clear is the exact 
nature of dysphoria’s influence on this socially relevant skill. In other words, do dysphoric individuals 
display a general negative bias or perhaps a specific emotion (e.g., sadness) bias in their perceptions of 
facial expressions? Or do dysphoric individuals exhibit a generalized deficit in emotion recognition? 
These questions remain to be addressed and the methodological issues described above describe a path 






The Proposed Role of Rumination in Emotion Recognition 
 As discussed previously, rumination has been shown to be influential in the phenomenology of 
depression and dysphoria. In fact, rumination has been shown to mediate many effects previously 
attributed to dysphoria or depression. For example, a longitudinal study found that rumination 
mediated the relationship between various risk factors (negative cognitive style, self-criticism, 
neediness) and the eventual development of depressive episodes (Spasojevic & Alloy, 2001). 
Furthermore, although previous studies have found that negative biases in ratings of facial expressions 
were associated with depressive symptomatology and severity (e.g., Bouhuys et al., 1996, Bouhuys et 
al., 1999; Hale, 1998), findings from a recent study suggest that rumination, not depressed mood, might 
be the key mechanism (Raes et al., 2006). The evidence is beginning to mount in favour of implicating a 
ruminative response style as an important proximal risk factor for the development or recurrence of 
depressive episodes. 
 To date, only one study has implicated rumination as the underlying factor in the association 
between depression/dysphoria and emotion recognition (Raes et al., 2006). For depressed participants, 
they demonstrated that greater endorsement of ruminative practices was associated with greater 
perceptions of negativity in schematic facial expressions. However, due to the correlational nature of 
their study, their results cannot speak towards the directionality of the relationship between rumination 
and biased emotion judgments. The results of their study were further limited by the lack of a control 
group. That is, while rumination is associated with biased processing in depressed participants, it is 
unclear whether this relationship would also be present in nondepressed participants. Indeed, as 
discussed previously, some researchers have demonstrated rumination effects in non-selected samples. 
 In summary, rumination has been shown to be closely linked with depression and dysphoria. 
Indeed, rumination is associated with various depression-related cognitive biases and impairments and 




process of interest in the proposed study. However, the exact nature of the relationship between 
depression/dysphoria and emotion recognition is unclear. Thus, the goals of Study 1 were to clarify this 
relationship by using several indices of emotion recognition and also to provide a stronger test of the 
causal association between rumination and emotion recognition using an experimental methodology. 
The aim of Study 2 was to extend this line of research by examining the mechanism by which rumination 






 The two primary goals of Study 1 are to: (a) clarify the nature of the relationship between 
dysphoria and emotion recognition, and (b) examine whether rumination is the causal mechanism by 
which dysphoric individuals exhibit emotion recognition impairments and/or biases. The bulk of the 
research suggests that depressed and dysphoric individuals do differ in some manner with respect to 
emotion recognition. Although some studies failed to find any evidence of a depressive impairment or 
bias, these studies are in the relative minority. Thus, the existing evidence is in favour of some sort of 
group difference, but there is decidedly less agreement with respect to the nature of this difference. In 
other words, is this group difference best represented in terms of an impairment (i.e., discrepancies in 
accuracy rates) or a bias? In an effort to clarify this issue, tasks were employed that examine both 
accuracy and bias. For the present study, accuracy is defined as the correct identification of the depicted 
emotion. While accuracy is relatively self-explanatory, bias is a concept that has been defined in two 
different ways. One method of defining bias is to do so in terms of accuracy. That is, a bias could refer to 
unequal performance across categories of test items. An intuitive hypothesis might be that depressed or 
dysphoric participants would be less accurate on positive items or more accurate on negative items 
compared to control participants but the existing evidence largely does not support this hypothesis. A 
similar hypothesis that has found greater traction is that depressed or dysphoric participants are more 
likely to mislabel neutral facial expressions in a negative manner. Indeed, studies have demonstrated 
that depressed participants are more likely to identify neutral faces as sad (Leppanen et al., 2004) or 
another negative emotion, fear (Kan et al., 2004).  
 A second method of defining bias is to do so in terms of stimulus intensity. Researchers who use 
this definition of bias have examined participants’ perceptions of emotional intensity and/or 
manipulated the emotional intensity level of the stimuli. Bouhuys and colleagues presented participants 




particular emotion (i.e., fear, happiness, anger, sadness, disgust, and surprise) that they perceived in 
these faces. Using this task, they demonstrated that depressed participants perceived more negativity 
and less positivity in the schematic faces compared to control participants (Hale, Jansen, Bouhuys, & van 
den Hoofdakker, 1998), and for depressed participants, greater endorsement of negative emotions was 
associated with higher rates of relapse (Bouhuys et al., 1999), and greater symptom severity and 
persistence (Hale, 1998). However, as mentioned previously, the schematic facial expressions are quite 
simplistic and lack the many nuances of a human face.  
 Yoon, Joorman, and Gotlib (2009) examined perceived stimulus intensity in another manner. 
Using photographs of mildly emotional (i.e., 40% intensity) facial expressions from a standardized series 
(Young, Perrett, Calder, Sprengelmeyer, & Ekman, 2002), they examined biases in the processing of 
subtle facial expressions of emotions. Specifically, participants were presented with pairs of faces, either 
a neutral face with a positive one (i.e., happy) or a negative face (i.e., sad, angry, fearful) with a positive 
one, and were asked to choose the more emotionally intense photograph. For both neutral-positive and 
negative-positive pairs, depressed participants were less likely to judge the positive face as more intense 
compared to nondepressed participants. Thus, their results are consistent with the notion of a 
depression-related negative bias or lack of a positive bias.  
 While the aforementioned line of research examined participants’ perceived intensity of the 
emotional stimuli, several studies varied the actual emotional intensity level of the facial expressions. 
Surguladze and colleagues (2004) used a standardized set of happy, sad, and neutral facial expressions 
(Young et al., 2002) and digitally morphed a neutral facial expression into an emotional one (i.e., faces 
expressing happiness or sadness) in order to create two intensity levels (50% and 100%) for facial 
expressions of happiness and sadness. Overall, depressed participants were less accurate in their 
labelling of the happy and sad faces compared to nondepressed participants. Moreover, depressed 




Gotlib (2006) also morphed happy and sad facial expressions from the same standardized set of stimuli 
but they also included angry facial expressions. Their task differed in that neutral facial expressions were 
gradually morphed into an emotional facial expression in small increments (10% intervals) and 
participants were asked to indicate when they could detect and identify an emotional expression. They 
found that depressed participants required higher intensity levels in order to detect happy facial 
expressions compared to control participants. Gilboa-Schechtman, Foa, Vaknin, Marom, and Hermesh 
(2008) used a similar morphing procedure to generate happy, sad, and angry faces of varying intensity 
levels (0-60%). Participants were presented with these mildly emotive photographs (as well as neutral 
ones) in a random order and were asked to label them as positive, negative, or neutral. They found that 
depressed participants were more likely to judge mildly sad and mildly angry faces as negative 
compared to control participants. Moreover, depressive symptom severity was positively associated 
with greater sensitivity to changes in intensity levels of sadness. Together, the results of these studies 
suggest that depressed individuals are less sensitive to facial cues associated with happiness and more 
sensitive to those associated with negative emotions.   
 Two studies examined both perceived and actual emotional intensity of the stimuli. Gur and 
colleagues (1992) used photographs of professional actors and actresses portraying happy and sad facial 
expressions at varying intensities as well as neutral facial expressions. Participants were asked to rate 
these photographs on a 7-point scale ranging from very happy to neutral to very sad. As predicted, 
depressed participants perceived more sadness in the photographs compared to nondepressed 
participants. However, it should be noted that neither the emotions portrayed (happiness and sadness) 
nor the intensity levels of the emotions were collected in a standardized, systematic manner. 
Conversely, Mendlewicz and colleagues (2005) employed a standardized series of photographs depicting 
emotional facial expressions (happiness, anger, sadness, disgust, and fear; Matsumoto & Ekman, 1998) 




to rate these photographs using an intensity scale similar to one employed by Bouhuys et al. (1996). 
Specifically, participants judged each photograph based on eight emotion scales (happiness, sadness, 
fear, anger, disgust, surprise, shame, and contempt). A judgment was considered accurate if the 
emotion scale that received the highest rating corresponded with the actual emotion portrayed in the 
photograph. Interestingly, depressed participants were less accurate than control participants at 
decoding angry faces but only when these faces were presented at an intensity level of 70%. No 
significant differences were found when they examined perceived intensity ratings. However, perhaps 
because the researchers were mainly interested in investigating emotion decoding in anorexic 
participants and only included depressed participants as a clinical control group, the depression group 
was comprised of a small number of participants (n = 21). Thus, their study may not have had sufficient 
statistical power to detect subtle group differences. Indeed, although depressed participants were less 
accurate than control and anorexic participants on all of the emotion categories, only one effect (i.e., 
anger) reached significance.    
 In order to elucidate the nature of the relationship between dysphoria and emotion recognition, 
I examined participants’ judgments of perceived emotional intensity and varied the actual emotional 
intensity of the stimuli as well. Including both aspects allows for the examination of participants’ 
perception of emotional stimuli as well as whether their ratings vary as a factor of objective differences 
in intensity. In addition, I aimed to further clarify this relationship by employing ambiguous stimuli 
(chimeric faces). Cognitive theories of depression suggest that when the stimuli or situation is not clear-
cut or straightforward, schema-related biases are more readily activated and employed (e.g., Beck, 
1976). Furthermore, a negative interpretive bias for ambiguous stimuli may represent a cognitive 
vulnerability for the development of depression (Dearing & Gotlib, 2009).  
Previous studies have demonstrated a negative interpretative bias for ambiguous stories (e.g., 




Eley et al., 2008; Hertel & El-Messidi, 2006; Lawson, MacLeod, & Hammond, 2002; Mogg, Bradbury, & 
Bradley, 2006) in depressed and dysphoric participants. Beyond verbal content, several researchers have 
also examined depressed individuals’ perceptions of ambiguous facial stimuli. For example, some studies 
have used chimeric faces in which the left half of the face displays a different emotion than the right half 
of the face. However, these studies specifically investigated hemifacial biases (i.e., perceiving greater 
emotionality on one side of the face instead of the other when the emotion displayed on either side is 
equivalent), which have been proposed as a biological marker for distinguishing subtypes of depression, 
rather than valence-specific biases (e.g., Bruder, Stewart, McGrath, Ma, Wexler, & Quitkin, 2002; 
Kucharska-Pietura & David, 2003). As mentioned previously, Bouhuys and colleagues employed 
schematic faces in their investigations of biased facial expression processing. Of note, their stimuli also 
included three ambiguous faces. In this case, the term ambiguous was defined as possessing equal 
amounts of positivity and negativity, using a top-bottom dichotomy rather than a left-right one. In other 
words, the eyes and the mouth of these ambiguous faces were of opposing valences. This line of 
research demonstrated that greater perception of negativity was associated with more severe and 
persistent depressive episodes (Hale, 1998) and greater risk of relapse (Bouhuys et al., 1999), but their 
results were either strongest for or only applicable to ratings of the ambiguous faces.   
 Although the results of Bouhuys and colleagues’ line of research are intriguing and consistent 
with cognitive theories of depression, the ambiguity of their ambiguous faces might be debatable. For 
example, one such ambiguous face was composed of “angry” eyes (eyebrows pointing down towards 
the middle of the face forming a ‘V’) and a smile. The end result appears decidedly negative and may not 
be ambiguous in terms of valence. This result is not surprising given that the eye region of the face is 
disproportionately influential in conveying emotionality (see Ekman, Friesen, & Ellsworth, 1972). 
Nonetheless, while its valence may not be ambiguous, the exact emotion conveyed may be more so 




does not represent a basic emotion but a more complex one which leaves greater room for 
interpretation. Again, it bears repeating that a limitation of the schematic faces is their dearth of 
ecological validity. A facial expression is comprised of complex interactions between many small facial 
muscle movements (Ekman & Friesen, 1978). Therefore, a basic line drawing of a face will not capture 
the many nuances of an actual emotional facial expression, especially a more complex one. 
 This study extended the work of Bouhuys and colleagues by employing more ecologically valid 
stimuli. The ambiguous photographs used in the present study were top-bottom chimeric faces. That is, 
the top and bottom halves of a chimeric face displayed one of four basic emotions (anger, fear, 
happiness, or sadness) or neutral with the caveat that the two halves displayed a different emotion. The 
original photographs (i.e., displaying only one emotion) were developed in accordance with FACS 
(Ekman & Friesen, 1978) and, thus, capture the many subtleties of an emotional facial expression. In 
doing so, the chimeric faces are more suited to conveying multiple emotional cues compared to 
schematic faces and this methodology has been shown to produce valid facial expressions (LaPlante & 
Ambady, 2000). Because of their emotional complexity, the chimeric faces allow for the examination of 
participants’ interpretations of ambiguous facial expressions. 
 The second goal of the present study was to examine the causal role of rumination in dysphoric 
individuals’ facial emotion processing by employing an induction methodology. Rumination has been 
proposed as the key mechanism that underlies the relationship between depression/dysphoria and 
various cognitive impairments and/or biases. Especially relevant to the present study, Raes and 
colleagues (2006) found that greater self-reported rumination was associated with greater perception of 
negativity in schematic facial expressions. The current study extends their work in several important 
ways.  First, Raes and colleagues only focused on bias whereas in the current study, I examined both bias 
and accuracy. Second, the current study employed the use of both straightforward and chimeric 




types of stimuli possess greater ecological validity than schematic line drawings. That is, the stimuli were 
developed in accordance with specifications outlined in FACS (Ekman & Friesen, 1978). Fourth, a control 
group of participants reporting few or minimal depressive symptoms was included to determine the 
generality of rumination’s effect on emotion recognition. Finally, Raes and colleagues used a 
correlational design which limits their conclusions regarding directionality of the effect. On the other 
hand, an experimental induction methodology allows for a stronger determination of causality. Thus, 
one of the major contributions of this study was to examine the causal role of rumination in depressive 
processing using a rigorous experimental design.  
 In summary, the data suggests that depressed or dysphoric individuals exhibit biased processing 
of emotional facial expressions. Specifically, depressed mood seems to be associated with a negative 
bias which manifests as perceiving greater negativity in negative or neutral stimuli or perceiving less 
positivity in positive stimuli. The majority of studies also suggest that dysphoric participants may be less 
accurate compared to nondysphoric participants at decoding facial expressions. There is also evidence 
to suggest that depressive biases may become more evident when the stimuli are ambiguous. Based on 
the existing evidence, I predicted that dysphoric participants will be less accurate on the facial emotion 
recognition task. However, whether group differences in accuracy will be emotion-specific or not is 
unclear. Furthermore, I predicted that dysphoric participants will perceive more negativity and less 
positivity in their ratings of emotional intensity and this difference will be exacerbated when the facial 
expression is more complex and ambiguous. These predictions are qualified by the type of induction 
that participants receive. That is, dysphoric participants are predicted to be less accurate and more 
negatively biased in their facial emotion judgments but only when they are induced to ruminate, not 
when they are induced to distract. When given a distraction induction, dysphoric participants should 







 Participants were 102 undergraduate students recruited from introductory psychology courses 
at the University of Waterloo. They received partial course credit for their participation in the study. In 
accordance with recommendations from Clark, Crewdson, and Purdon (1998), six participants were 
excluded from the analyses because they scored 0 or 1 on the BDI-II. An additional seven participants 
were not included in the final sample, four of whom failed to complete all of the questionnaires and 
three of whom experienced technical difficulties and, thus, could not complete all of the tasks. The final 
sample included 89 participants (28 men, 57 women, 4 declined to provide their gender) with 45 in the 
rumination condition (14 men, 29 women, 2 declined to answer) and 44 in the distraction condition (14 
men, 29 women, 2 declined to answer).  
Materials 
Rumination Induction (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993). Participants randomly assigned to 
the rumination condition received a modified version of Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow’s rumination 
induction procedure. In the original procedure, participants are presented with 45 statements designed 
to focus their attention on themselves (e.g., “Think about why your body feels this way”). Participants 
are given 8 minutes to work their way through these statements. In the modified version, rather than 
being a self-paced task, participants were given 15s to read and focus on each statement. Like the 
original procedure, the induction task lasted 8 minutes. Given the 8-minute length of the task (designed 
to be consistent with past research), participants saw most but not all of the rumination items. 
Therefore, the order of presentation of these statements was randomized across participants. This 
modification was aimed at eliminating possible group differences in the amount of time spent focusing 




 Distraction Induction (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993). Participants randomly assigned to the 
distraction condition received a modified version of Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow’s distraction 
induction procedure. This induction procedure is similar to the rumination induction procedure 
described above. However, rather than being presented with self-focus statements, participants were 
asked to focus their attention outward (e.g., “Think about clouds forming in the sky”). The distraction 
induction lasted 8 minutes with each statement presented for 15s and the order of presentation of the 
items was randomized. 
Accuracy Task. This task assesses participants’ emotion recognition abilities. The accuracy task 
consisted of black-and-white photographs of people’s faces that are standardized to the same size (280 
pixels X 480 pixels). The stimuli included photographs of four target individuals (two males, two females) 
mimicking facial expressions of five different emotions (anger, fear, happiness, sadness, and neutral). A 
trained research assistant instructed the target participants to express each emotion according to 
detailed specifications outlined by Marshall (2005) which were based on Ekman and Friesen’s (1978) 
Facial Action Coding System. The photographs used in this study were also independently verified by 
two FACS-trained coders. Furthermore, each person was asked to express each emotion at three 
intensity levels (low, medium, high; see Figure 2). Of course, varying intensity levels could not be 
obtained for the neutral facial expression. Nonetheless, three different photographs of the target with a 
neutral facial expression was included in the stimulus set in order to avoid having participants view the 
exact same neutral face more times than they would view other emotion faces. Thus, in total, the 
stimulus set consists of 72 photographs. Finally, the photographs were converted into gray scale using 
image editing software in order to minimize any confounding effects of colour in the photographs. The 
stimuli were presented on a notebook computer using E-Prime software.  
Each trial began with a fixation cross presented for 1000ms, the purpose of which was to orient 




the screen for 60ms. This presentation time was chosen because previous studies recommend using 
shorter durations to detect subtle, depression-related cognitive impairments (e.g., Surguladze et al., 
2004). Furthermore, this brief presentation time also served to reduce the possibility of obtaining ceiling 
effects. Finally, participants were presented with four response options (i.e., the correct response and 
three distracters) and were asked to indicate their response, as quickly and accurately as possible, by 
pressing one of four keys on the keyboard. Each photograph was presented a total of four times with 
each presentation accompanied by a different set of response options (to ensure that all photographs 
were presented with all possible response option combinations). The order of presentation of the 
photographs as well as the position of the response options (i.e., top left vs. top right vs. bottom left vs. 
bottom right) was randomized. In addition to participants’ responses, their reaction time was also 
recorded. Once participants have indicated their response, the next trial was initiated. 
 Bias Task. This task utilized the same stimulus set as the accuracy task. However, rather than 
identifying the emotion displayed in the faces, participants rated the amount of emotionality that they 
perceived in each photograph. Specifically, each photograph was shown four times, each time asking 
participants to rate how strongly that particular photograph depicted a certain emotion (i.e., anger, fear, 
sadness, happiness). Consistent with previous studies that have employed this task (e.g., Bouhuys et al., 
1996; Hale, 1998; Raes et al., 2006), participants indicated their response using a five-point scale (1 = not 
at all to 5 = very strongly).  
 All items were randomly presented to participants in one block. Also similar to the accuracy 
task, participants were first presented with a fixation cross for 1000ms followed by a photograph for 
60ms. Finally, participants were presented with the aforementioned response scale. To indicate their 
response, participants pressed a key on the keyboard that corresponded to their desired answer. 




 Chimera Task. The stimuli for this task differed from the photographs used for the other two 
tasks. Although the same photographs as the ones used for the Accuracy and Bias tasks were used in the 
development of this stimulus set, each photograph was altered to create new photographs depicting 
mixed emotions. Using an image editing software, each photograph was separated into two halves 
(upper and lower) which were approximately equal in size. The halfway point down the bridge of the 
nose was used as a guideline for the editing process. Thus, for each photograph, this process resulted in 
two pictures, the upper and lower halves of the target’s face. Next, the new photographs were carefully 
pieced together to form the chimeric faces. Only facial halves from the same target person were 
combined (e.g., the upper half of Target A’s face was not put together with the lower half of Target B’s 
face). Furthermore, facial halves representing the same emotion but at different levels of intensity were 
not combined. Only the low and high intensity photographs were included in this process in order to 
keep the stimulus set at a reasonable number. With these guidelines in place, all possible combinations 
of photographs were created resulting in 320 new photographs depicting mixed emotions (e.g., fear in 
the upper half of the face and happiness in the lower half; see Figure 3).   
 Due to the large number of photographs, participants were only presented with half of the 
photographs. That is, for each combination of emotions (e.g., low intensity anger and high intensity 
happiness), there are two possible chimeric faces (anger in the upper half of the face with happiness in 
the lower half and vice versa). Thus, participants only saw one of the two possible chimeric faces for 
each combination of emotions. The face that was presented was randomly determined for each 
participant. 
The procedure of this task was the same as that of the Bias task. Participants were presented 
with a fixation cross for 1000ms followed by a randomly selected photograph presented for 60ms. 
Participants then rated how strongly that photograph depicted an emotion (i.e., anger, fear, sadness, 




participants pressed the key on the keyboard that corresponded to their desired answer. As well, 
participants’ reaction time was recorded. 
 Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck, 1996). The BDI-II is a 21-item self-report questionnaire 
which assesses the presence and severity of depressive symptoms. Scores for each item on the BDI-II 
ranges from 0-3 and all items are summed to create a total score with higher scores indicating more 
severe depressive symptomatology. This questionnaire is widely used in depression research and many 
studies have established its concurrent and discriminant validity as well as its high internal consistency 
(e.g., Beck, Steer, & Garbin, 1988). In addition, this measure’s test-retest reliability has ranged from .67 
to .90 (Lightfoot & Oliver, 1985; Oliver & Burkham, 1979; Oliver & Simmons, 1984).  
 Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionaire (MASQ; Watson & Clark, 1991). The MASQ is a 90-
item self-report measure of both depressive and anxious symptoms. This questionnaire employs a 5-
point response scale (1 = not at all to 5 = extremely) and yields five indexes. Two of the indexes, 
Anhedonic Depression (AD) and Anxious Arousal (AA), assess symptoms that differentiate depression 
and anxiety, respectively. The other three indexes load onto General Distress (GD; i.e., symptoms 
common to both depression and anxiety). This scale has considerable psychometric evidence for its 
convergent and discriminant validity (Watson, Weber, Assenheimer, Clark, Strauss, & McCormick, 1995). 
More important for the purposes of this study, the MASQ was designed to assess symptoms that are 
unique to depression and anxiety. Because depression and anxiety tend to co-occur, the AA index was 
used as a covariate to account for the contributions of purely anxious symptoms to task performance.  
Procedure 
 Once participants have been informed about the study and given their written informed 
consent, they were randomly assigned to receive a rumination or distraction induction. Prior to receiving 
the assigned induction, participants completed the questionnaire packet which was comprised of the 




Chimera). The order of the three tasks was counterbalanced across participants. In order to familiarize 
participants with the demands of each task, they completed several practice items at the beginning of 
each task. These practice items required participants to make the same type of judgments as the task in 
question, but the stimuli were photographs that were not used for the final stimulus sets (i.e., the 
targets are not the same people). Upon completion of the study, participants were debriefed and 
received their course credit as compensation. 
Results 
Condition Randomization 
 To ensure that participants were, indeed, properly randomized, their scores on the BDI-II and AA 
were examined across the two conditions. First, an independent samples t-test was conducted with 
Condition (rumination induction vs. distraction induction) as the between-subjects factor and BDI-II 
scores as the dependent factor. Participants’ level of dysphoria did not differ between the two 
conditions (Rumination: M = 13.16, SD = 8.82; Distraction: M = 13.86, SD = 8.64), t(87) = -0.38, p = .70. A 
second independent samples t-test was conducted with Condition as the between-subjects factor and 
AA scores as the dependent factor. Participants’ level of anxiety also did not differ between the two 
conditions (Rumination: M = 31.16, SD = 12.63; Distraction: M = 33.00, SD = 12.50), t(87) = -0.69, p = .49. 
Therefore, neither dysphoria nor anxiety was confounded with the induction manipulation.  
General Analytic Model 
 The majority of the analyses discussed below are based on one main analytic model which is 
described in this section for simplicity’s sake. This model was used for the main analyses comparing the 
rumination and distraction inductions across the three experimental tasks. For this model, an effects-
coded variable was created to compare participants in the rumination and distraction conditions 
(Induction: rumination = +1, distraction = -1). The Induction variable, centered BDI-II scores, and the 




sadness vs. happiness vs. fear vs. neutral) was the within-subjects factor. Centered AA scores were 
included as a covariate1. The predictor variables and covariates were held constant for the analyses 
described below, but the models differed in terms of the dependent variable. 
Accuracy Task Analyses 
 Correlations. First, correlations between participants’ BDI-II scores and their overall accuracy on 
the accuracy task (expressed as a percent) as well as specific accuracy for the five emotions were 
conducted (see Table 1 for correlations between questionnaire scores and indices of accuracy). For the 
rumination condition, the correlation between BDI-II scores and overall accuracy was significant, r(43) = 
-.50, p < .001, such that higher BDI-II scores were associated with lower levels of overall accuracy. 
Participants’ BDI-II scores were also significantly correlated with the accuracy for anger, r(43) = -.40, p = 
.007, fear, r(43) = -.50, p < .001, happiness, r(43) = -.32, p = .03, and sadness, r(43) = -.41, p = .005, such 
that higher BDI-II scores were associated with lower levels of accuracy for anger, fear, happiness, and 
sadness. There was no significant association between BDI-II scores and accuracy for the neutral 
condition, r(43) = -.22, p = .15. As for the distraction condition, none of the correlations between BDI-II 
scores and overall or specific emotion accuracy were significant (ps > .37). Thus, greater endorsement of 
depressive symptoms was generally associated with poorer facial emotion decoding accuracy when 
participants were given a rumination induction but not when they were given a distraction induction. 
 General Linear Model (GLM) Analysis. A mixed-design GLM analysis was conducted to examine 
performance on the accuracy task. As described above, the main analytic model was employed with 
percent accuracy on the task as the dependent measure. In general, participants’ accuracy across the 
five emotions differed, F(4, 84) = 28.55, p < .001 (see Table 2 for results of the follow-up paired-samples 
                                                          
1
 Miller and Chapman (2001) highlighted concerns about including an anxiety covariate in analyses involving 
depressive symptoms as a predictor. To address this issue, all of the main analyses (including those in Study 2) 
were re-computed without the inclusion of the AA covariate. Results of the re-analyses indicated that the exclusion 
of the AA covariate did not significantly alter the findings and, in fact, the effects were slightly stronger when this 




t-test). None of the other main effects or interaction were significant (ps > .29) except for the Induction 
X BDI-II interaction, F(1, 84) = 5.15, p = .026.    
 Simple slopes analyses were conducted to interpret the significant Induction X BDI-II interaction. 
That is, the simple Induction main effect was examined separately at two levels of BDI-II. Prior to 
conducting the simple slopes analyses, two new continuous variables were created. As suggested by 
Cohen and Cohen (1983) and Cohen, Cohen, West, and Aiken (2003), I selected a value of one SD to 
create these new variables because there were no a priori reasons for selecting other specific high and 
low values. The first variable, High BDI-II, corresponded to one standard deviation above the centered 
BDI mean, and was created by subtracting one standard deviation from each participant’s centered BDI-
II score. The other variable, Low BDI-II, corresponded to one standard deviation below the centered BDI-
II mean, and was created by adding one standard deviation from each participant’s centered BDI-II score 
(Aiken & West, 1991; Cohen & Cohen, 1983; Cohen et al., 2003; West, Aiken, & Krull, 1996).  
In regression, the effects of one variable are interpreted when all other variables equal zero. 
Because I centered my continuous predictors, the results from the primary analyses were interpreted 
with respect to the mean value of the other variables (because for centered scores, the mean value is 
zero). Therefore, when utilizing the new High BDI-II and Low BDI-II variables, zero is no longer the BDI-II 
mean, but one standard deviation above and below the BDI mean, respectively. 
To test the simple Induction effect at high and low levels of BDI-II, two separate regression 
analyses were conducted. As participants’ accuracy across the five emotions did not differ between the 
two induction conditions, percent accuracy was collapsed across the different emotions. Percent 
accuracy on this task was regressed onto: 1) an effects-coded Induction variable (rumination = +1, 
distraction = -1), High BDI-II scores, the two-way Induction X High BDI-II interaction, and the centered AA 
covariate; and 2) an effects-coded Induction variable (rumination = +1, distraction = -1), Low BDI-II 




analyses are represented in Figure 4. Participants who endorsed more depressive symptoms performed 
less accurately on this task when given a rumination induction than when given a distraction induction, 
B = -.10, t(85) = -4.34, p < .001. However, no induction group differences were observed at lower BDI-II 
levels, B = -.03, t(85) = -1.22, p = .22.  
 Reaction Time Analyses. To examine the possibility that performance differences were 
attributable to a speed/accuracy tradeoff strategy, a mixed-design GLM analysis was conducted. Again, 
the main analytic model was used with mean reaction time on the task as the dependent measure.  
In general, participants’ reaction times across the five emotions differed, F(4, 84) = 36.61, p < .001 (see 
Table 3 for results of the follow-up paired-samples t-test). The BDI-II main effect was marginally 
significant, F(1, 84) = 3.74, p = .06, such that higher BDI-II scores was associated with slower reaction 
times. None of the other main effects or interactions was significant (ps > .15). Although participants 
who reported more depressive symptoms were generally slower to respond to the items, this effect did 
not differ as a function of the induction that they received. 
Bias Task Analyses 
 Correlations. First, correlations between participants’ BDI-II scores and their overall intensity 
ratings on the bias task as well as specific ratings for the four emotions were conducted (see Table 4 for 
correlations between questionnaire scores and indices of perceived intensity). For the rumination 
condition, the correlation between BDI-II scores and overall intensity rating was marginally significant, 
r(43) =.26, p = .09. With respect to specific emotion ratings, there was a significant correlation between 
BDI-II scores and anger intensity ratings, r(43) = .32, p = .03, and a marginally significant correlation 
between BDI-II scores and fear intensity ratings, r(43) = .27, p = .08. None of the other correlations were 
significant. As for the distraction condition, none of the correlations between BDI-II scores and overall or 
specific emotion intensity ratings were significant (ps > .33). Thus, greater endorsement of depressive 




and fear) when participants were given a rumination induction but not when they were given a 
distraction induction. 
 General Linear Model (GLM) Analysis. A mixed-design GLM analysis was conducted to examine 
performance on the bias task. The main analytic model was used with participants’ emotional intensity 
ratings as the dependent measure. In general, participants’ emotional intensity ratings across the four 
emotions differed, F(3, 82) = 21.76, p < .001 (see Table 5 for results of the follow-up paired-samples t-
test). None of the other main effects or interaction were significant (ps > .36) except for the main effect 
of the AA covariate which was marginally significant, B = .35, t(84) = 1.81, p = .07, which indicated that 
greater endorsement of anxiety symptoms was associated with greater perceived emotional intensity 
regardless of the type of induction participants received.  
Reaction Time Analyses. Reaction time differences were also examined using a mixed-design 
GLM analysis. The main analytic model was utilized with mean reaction time on the task as the 
dependent measure. In general, participants’ reaction times across the four emotions differed, F(3, 82) = 
16.90, p < .001 (see Table 6 for results of the follow-up paired-samples t-test). None of the other main 
effects or interactions were significant (ps > .19).  
Chimera Task Analyses 
 Correlations. First, correlations between participants’ BDI-II scores and their overall intensity 
ratings on the chimera task as well as specific ratings for the four emotions were conducted (see Table 7 
for correlations between questionnaire scores and indices of perceived intensity). For the rumination 
condition, the correlation between BDI-II scores and overall intensity rating was significant, r(43) =.41, p 
= .005. With respect to specific emotion ratings, there was a significant correlation between BDI-II scores 
and anger intensity ratings, r(43) = .42, p = .004, fear intensity ratings, r(43) = .38, p = .009, and 
happiness intensity ratings, r(43) = .36, p = .016, but not sadness intensity ratings (p = .32). As for the 




intensity ratings were significant (ps > .44). Thus, greater endorsement of depressive symptoms was 
generally associated with greater perceived emotional intensity (particularly for anger, fear, and 
happiness) when participants were given a rumination induction but not when they were given a 
distraction induction. 
 General Linear Model (GLM) Analysis. A mixed-design GLM analysis was conducted to examine 
performance on the chimera task. The main analytic model was used with participants’ emotional 
intensity ratings as the dependent measure. In general, participants’ emotional intensity ratings across 
the four emotions differed, F(3, 82) = 41.52, p < .001 (see Table 8 for results of the follow-up paired-
samples t-test). The main effect of the AA covariate was significant, B = .57, t(84) = 2.24, p = .03, such 
that greater endorsement of anxiety symptoms was associated with greater perceived emotional 
intensity regardless of the type of induction participants received. In addition, the Induction X BDI-II 
interaction was marginally significant, B = .91, t(84) = 1.69, p = .09. No other effects were significant (ps 
> .46). 
Simple slopes analyses (see Figure 5) were conducted to test the simple Induction effect at high 
and low levels of BDI-II. As participants’ emotional intensity ratings across the four emotions did not 
differ between the two induction conditions, their ratings were collapsed across the different emotions. 
Results indicated that no induction group differences were observed at either lower BDI-II levels, B = -
6.79, t(84) = -1.03, p = .31, or higher BDI-II levels, B = 9.07, t(84) = 1.69, p = .18. 
Reaction Time Analyses. Reaction time differences were examined using a mixed-design GLM 
analysis. The main analytic model was employed with mean reaction time on the task as the dependent 
measure. In general, participants’ reaction times across the four emotions differed, F(3, 82) = 30.58, p < 
.001 (see Table 9 for results of the follow-up paired-samples t-test). In addition, the BDI-II main effect 
was marginally significant, B = 18.59, t(84) = 1.85, p = .07, and the main effect of the AA covariate was 




mood and lower levels of anxiety are associated with longer reaction times. None of the other main 
effects or interactions were significant (ps > .18).  
Discussion 
 The main goals of Study 1 were to elucidate the relationship between dysphoria and facial 
emotion recognition and to determine whether rumination is an underlying mechanism in this 
association. I hypothesized that for participants who were asked to ruminate, greater endorsement of 
depressive symptoms would be associated with lower facial emotion recognition accuracy rates. This 
relationship was not expected to be present for participants who are asked to distract. Correlational 
analyses demonstrated that greater levels of dysphoric mood were associated with poorer identification 
of four out of five emotional faces (anger, sadness, happiness, and fear, but not neutral) but only when 
participants received a rumination induction. Given that these correlations were of the same direction 
and of similar magnitude, it was not surprising that participants’ level of dysphoria was not associated 
with differential performance across the five types of facial expressions. Using a single index of accuracy 
(as opposed to examining accuracy for each emotion), analyses revealed that participants who endorsed 
more depressive symptoms were less accurate at identifying the emotion portrayed when they received 
a rumination induction compared to their counterparts who received a distraction induction. However, 
for participants who endorsed fewer depressive symptoms, no group differences emerged between 
those who received a rumination or a distraction induction. Taken together, these results suggest that 
the confluence of dysphoria and rumination can better account for poor facial emotion identification 
than either factor in isolation.  
 I also hypothesized that participants who endorsed greater depressive symptoms would 
perceive greater negativity in the facial stimuli. For the bias task, this hypothesis was partially supported 
by correlational analyses which indicated that higher levels of dysphoric mood were associated with 




results from subsequent analyses suggest that these correlational differences between groups were not 
statistically significant. Of course, each picture for the bias task depicted only one emotion and, thus, 
may have been too straightforward to elicit biased responding. A related hypothesis was that 
differences in perceived emotional intensity would be exacerbated when the stimuli are more complex 
and ambiguous. Similar to the results from the bias task, correlational analyses for the chimera task 
indicated that greater endorsement of depressive symptoms was associated with greater perceived 
intensity of anger and fear but only for those in the rumination condition. Interestingly, the positive 
relationship between dysphoria and intensity rating was also applicable to happiness. Using a single 
index of perceived emotional intensity, subsequent analyses demonstrated a significant interaction 
between dysphoria and induction condition. While Figure 5 suggests that participants who endorsed 
greater depressive symptoms perceived more emotional intensity when they received a rumination 
induction compared to those who received a distraction induction and vice versa for those who 
endorsed fewer depressive symptoms, it must be stressed that neither slope was significant.   
 For all three tasks, participants’ accuracy for or rating of specific emotions did not differ as a 
function of their level of dysphoria. Interestingly, happiness was typically perceived differently than the 
other emotions. Specifically, participants were most accurate at identifying happiness and rated happy 
faces as the least intense. That happiness stood apart from the other emotions is not surprising given 
that it was the only emotion represented that was of a positive valence. While differences were 
demonstrated between negatively-valenced emotions (sadness, fear, anger), they were not as 
consistent or as prominent.  
 In summary, rumination appeared to negatively impact dysphoric participants’ ability to 
accurately identify emotional facial expressions. Furthermore, correlational analyses suggested that 
dysphoric participants who were induced to ruminate perceived certain emotions, particularly fear and 




complex and ambiguous. Thus, the evidence indicated that the ruminative process uniquely affects 
individuals who endorse higher levels of dysphoria. However, the question of how rumination impacts 
facial emotional information processing remains. One possibility is that dysphoric ruminators overthink 
their answers and, thus, take more time to respond. Indeed, studies have demonstrated that a more 
deliberate and reasoned approach can hinder the accuracy of certain types of judgments (e.g., Ambady 
& Gray, 2002). However, results from the present study do not favour this hypothesis. Another 
possibility is that the cognitive load placed on dysphoric individuals due to their ruminative tendencies 
hinders performance accuracy. Study 2 aimed to investigate this hypothesis in addition to replicating the 






 The goal of Study 1 was not only to clarify the relationship between dysphoria and several 
indices of emotion recognition, but also to examine the role of rumination in this relationship. Overall, 
there was evidence to suggest that the combined influence of dysphoria and induced rumination 
negatively impacts accuracy of facial emotion recognition and, to a lesser extent, perceived intensity of 
emotional facial expressions. The aim of Study 2 was to further elucidate the manner by which 
rumination influences dysphoric processing (see Figure 6). While many studies have documented 
rumination’s effects on various cognitive processes, there is a relative dearth of studies examining how 
rumination affects these processes.  
 The proposed mechanism that was examined in the present study involves rumination’s effect 
on the availability of cognitive resources (see Figure 7 for a schematic representation of the rumination-
as-cognitive-load hypothesis). Rumination is defined as an analytical, effortful form of thinking involving 
a constant cycling of unpleasant thoughts. Indeed, dysphoric participants who were induced to ruminate 
reported greater difficulty concentrating on various academic tasks, were slower to complete these 
tasks, and exhibited overall poorer performance in contrast to dysphoric participants who were given a 
distraction induction (Lyubomirsky et al., 2003). Similarly, in a rumination analogue study, Krames and 
MacDonald (1985) demonstrated dual-task performance deficits in depressed participants (compared to 
control participants) when the tasks were moderately but not highly taxing. The researchers attributed 
this deficit to the additional load caused by ruminative thoughts and posited that a highly taxing task 
would, in essence, act as a distraction from depressed participants’ ruminating. Although rumination 
may be considered relatively effortful, it should not negatively impact emotion recognition if this latter 
process is an entirely automatic one. Of course, cognitive processes are not simply dichotomized as 
either automatic or effortful but rather automaticity is generally conceptualized as a continuum (Hasher 




Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin, 1988). If a cognitive process is considered to be wholly automatic (or at least very 
nearly so), it should be immune to disruption from another cognitive process (see Hartlage, Alloy, 
Vazquez, & Dykman, 1993, for an in-depth discussion of automatic and effortful processes). Therefore, if 
facial emotion recognition is a completely automatic process, then the heavy strain that rumination 
places on cognitive resources should not have an effect on emotion recognition performance. There is 
some existing evidence to suggest that emotion recognition may be at least somewhat automatic. For 
example, subliminally presented emotional facial expressions have been shown to influence 
participants’ subsequent behaviours and judgments in a manner consistent with the stimuli (Dimberg & 
Thunberg, 1998; Dimberg, Thunberg, & Elmehed, 2000; Niedenthal, 1990; Winkielman, Berridge, & 
Wilbarger, 2005). However, a recent study suggests that facial emotion recognition may not be entirely 
automatic. Tracy and Robins (2008) found that participants, overall, were fairly accurate at identifying 
facial expressions when asked to do so quickly (i.e., within 1000 ms) or under cognitive load (i.e., 
rehearsing a 7-digit number). However, participants’ accuracy rates improved when they were given 
more time to respond. Therefore, facial emotion recognition appears to not be wholly automatic, but 
rather it is at least somewhat effortful as performance improved when cognitive resources were not 
stressed. 
Although Study 1 did not yield strong evidence to support the presence of biasing effects of 
dysphoria and rumination, both the Bias and Chimera tasks were included in Study 2. Their inclusion 
allows for a more thorough examination of possible similarities (and differences) between the effects of 
induced rumination and cognitive load. Specifically, whereas results from Study 1 suggest that 
rumination seems to impact accuracy of emotion identification but not perception of emotional 
intensity, a cognitive load may influence both accuracy and perceived intensity. Researchers have shown 
that when participants’ cognitive systems are sufficiently taxed, they increasingly rely on less effortful 




in cognitive theories of depression, are another form of efficient processing. For example, Reich and 
Weary (1998) found that when sufficient cognitive resources were available, participants in dysphoric 
and nondysphoric groups did not differ in the valence of their dispositional and situational inferences. 
However, when participants were cognitively busy, dysphoric participants made more negative 
dispositional and situational inferences than did those in the nondysphoric group. Similar negative 
biases have also been demonstrated in at-risk participants (i.e., previously depressed but currently 
asymptomatic) when they were cognitively taxed (e.g., Wenzlaff & Bates, 1998). With respect to the 
present study, when a cognitive load (which is effortful) is introduced, negative processing biases (which 
are more efficient) may become more apparent in dysphoric individuals. 
 The present study examined the viability of the rumination-as-cognitive-load hypothesis. In 
other words, is rumination’s effect on facial emotion recognition due to the cognitive load it places on 
dysphoric individuals? To address this question, the present study features a cognitive load condition in 
addition to the rumination and distraction conditions. Specifically, rather than receiving an induction, 
participants assigned to this condition were presented with a nine-digit number prior to each emotion 
recognition task and were asked to rehearse this number during the task. Previous studies have 
successfully used the digit-memorization task to tax participants’ cognitive resources (e.g., Andersen & 
Limpert, 2001; Gilbert & Hixon; 1991; Reich & Weary, 1998; Swann, Hixon, Stein-Seroussi, & Gilbert, 
1990; Wenzlaff & Bates, 1998). Based on previous studies that have examined the influence of cognitive 
loads on depressive processing, I predicted that dysphoric participants in the cognitive load condition 
will perform similarly to dysphoric participants in the rumination but not distraction condition on the 
Accuracy task. That is, dysphoric participants in the cognitive load and rumination conditions will be less 
accurate. In contrast, dysphoric participants in the distraction condition should perform more similarly 
to nondysphoric participants in the rumination and distraction conditions. Following the results from 




the Bias and Chimera tasks. I also predicted that nondysphoric participants who are given a cognitive 
load will be less accurate at identifying facial expressions compared to nondysphoric participants in the 
other two conditions. The burdens of an additional, simultaneous task should sufficiently reduce their 
cognitive resources, thus reducing their accuracy. However, as nondysphoric participants should not be 
influenced by negative schemas, they should not exhibit a negative bias in their emotion recognition 
performance.   
 In addition to the main hypotheses, I also investigated an additional methodological issue which 
involves the negative tone and valence that is characteristic of the standard rumination induction 
methodology that has been used in past studies. Specifically, the concern is that the standard 
rumination induction (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993) that is typically used in past studies may lead 
to both an inward focus as well as induce negative affect, thus confounding these two processes.  
Indeed, researchers have commented on the overlap between measures of ruminative tendencies and 
depressive symptoms (Conway, Csank, Holm, & Blake, 2000; Cox, Enns, & Taylor, 2001; Roberts, Gilboa, 
& Gotlib, 1998; Segerstrom, Tsao, Alden, & Craske, 2000; Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003). 
Similarly, Purdon and Nilsen (personal communication, November 2009) observed that certain items 
employed in the rumination induction developed by Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow (1993) exhibited a 
negative tone or valence. Therefore, an additional condition was included which involved a rumination 
induction denuded of its negative content (see below for more detailed information regarding the 
development of this induction). As the inclusion of this condition was for exploratory purposes, specific 
hypotheses were not given. Instead, this neutral rumination condition was used primarily to assess 









 Participants were 184 undergraduate students recruited from introductory psychology courses 
at the University of Waterloo. They received partial course credit for their participation in the study. Five 
participants were not included in the analyses because they scored 0 or 1 on the BDI-II (based on 
recommendations by Clark et al., 1998). Another seven participants were excluded from the analyses 
because they failed to complete all experimental tasks and questionnaires due to technical difficulties. 
Therefore, the final sample included 172 participants (43 men, 115 women, 14 chose not to disclose) 
with 45 in the rumination condition (12 men, 30 women, 3 chose not to disclose), 43 in the distraction 
condition (11 men, 29 women, 3 chose not to disclose), 42 in the cognitive load condition (9 men, 28 
women, 5 chose not to disclose), and 42 in the neutral rumination condition (11 men, 28 women, 3 
chose not to disclose).  
Materials 
 Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions: rumination induction, distraction 
induction, neutral rumination induction, and cognitive load. These conditions are described in greater 
detail below. 
 Induction Conditions. Approximately three-quarters of the participants were randomly assigned 
to receive a rumination, distraction, or neutral rumination induction. The rumination and distraction 
induction tasks were previously described for Study 1.  
The neutral rumination induction was a slight modification on the rumination induction. That is, 
the structure and procedure of the induction remained the same, but the content was slightly altered. 
As discussed above, certain phrases used in the rumination induction could be construed as somewhat 
negative in tone. Specifically, phrases that contained words with negative connotations (e.g., 




statements) were re-worded in a manner that made them more neutral in tone but maintained the 
original meaning. In all, 10 of the 45 induction phrases were altered for the neutral rumination 
induction.  
 Cognitive Load Condition. The final one-quarter of the participants randomly assigned to the 
cognitive load condition were presented with a different, randomly generated nine-digit number prior to 
each experimental task. They were given 30s to memorize this number and were instructed that they 
will be asked to report this number upon completion of each task. 
 Experimental Tasks. As in Study 1, participants completed, in a counterbalanced order, the 
Accuracy, Bias, and Chimera tasks.  
 Questionnaires. Again, participants completed the BDI-II and MASQ.  
Procedure 
 Once participants have been informed about the study and given their written informed 
consent, they were randomly assigned to the rumination, distraction, cognitive load, or neutral 
rumination condition. Prior to receiving the assigned induction or cognitive load, participants completed 
the questionnaire packet which was comprised of the BDI-II and MASQ. Next, participants completed 
the three experimental tasks (Accuracy, Bias, and Chimera). Participants completed several practice 
items at the beginning of each task. Upon completion of the study, participants were debriefed and 
received their course credit as compensation. 
Results 
Condition Randomization 
 Participants’ scores on the BDI-II and the AA subscale of the MASQ were examined across the 
four conditions to verify that the randomization procedure was successful. First, a one-way analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) was conducted with Condition (rumination vs. distraction vs. cognitive load vs. neutral 




of dysphoria did not differ between the four conditions, F(3, 168) = .14, p = .93. Another ANOVA was 
conducted with Condition as the between-subjects factor and AA scores as the dependent factor. 
Participants’ level of anxiety also did not differ between the four conditions, F(3, 168) = .50, p = .68. 
Therefore, the results indicated that neither dysphoria nor anxiety was unequally distributed across 
groups (see Table 10 for descriptive statistics of each questionnaire across the four conditions).  
Cognitive Load Manipulation Check 
 For the accuracy task, of the 42 participants in the cognitive load condition, 13 participants 
(30.95%) correctly recalled the nine-digit number at the end of the task. An additional eight participants 
(19.05%) made one recall error (e.g., one incorrect digit or a pair of transposed numbers), six (14.28%) 
made two recall errors, five (11.90%) made three recall errors, and 10 (23.81%) made four or more 
recall errors. For the bias task, 14 participants (33.33%) correctly recalled the nine-digit number upon 
completion of the task, five (11.90%) made one recall error, four (9.52%) made two recall errors, seven 
(16.67%) made three recall errors, and 12 (28.57%) made four or more recall errors. Finally, for the 
chimera task, 11 participants (26.19%) correctly recalled the nine-digit number, eight (19.05%) made 
one recall error, six (14.28%) made two recall errors, two (4.76%) made three recall errors, and 15 
(35.71%) made four or more recall errors.  
 For all three experimental tasks, a t-test with load task accuracy (correct vs. incorrect) as the 
independent variable and participants’ BDI-II scores as the dependent variables was conducted to assess 
for possible dysphoria-related effects. Results revealed that recall for the nine-digit number did not vary 
as a function of participants’ endorsement of depressive symptoms for any of the experimental tasks (ps 
> .42). Taken together with the above findings, participants appeared to be sufficiently engaged in the 






General Analytic Model 
 The majority of the analyses discussed below are based on two analytic models and, thus, are 
described in this section for simplicity’s sake. Model 1 was employed for the main analyses comparing 
the rumination, distraction, and cognitive load conditions across the three experimental tasks. The 
predictor variables and covariates were held constant for these analyses and they differed chiefly in the 
dependent variable of interest. For Model 1, two contrast-coded variables were created, one comparing 
participants in the rumination and cognitive load conditions with those in the distraction condition 
(Contrast 1; rumination = +.33, distraction = -.67, cognitive load = +.33), and the other examining 
whether performance differs between the rumination and cognitive load conditions (Contrast 2: 
rumination = +.50, distraction = 0, cognitive load = -.50). These contrast-coded variables, Contrast 1 and 
Contrast 2, centered BDI-II scores, the two-way Contrast 1 X BDI-II interaction, and the two-way Contrast 
2 X BDI-II interaction were the between-subjects predictors. Emotion (fear vs. anger vs. sadness vs. 
happiness vs. neutral) was the within-subjects factor. Centered AA scores were included as a covariate. 
 Model 2 was employed for the exploratory analyses comparing the rumination condition with 
the neutral rumination condition. Specifically, an effects-coded Condition variable (rumination = +1, 
neutral rumination = -1), centered BDI-II scores, and the two-way Condition X BDI-II interaction were the 
between-subjects predictors. Emotion (fear vs. anger vs. sadness vs. happiness vs. neutral) was the 
within-subjects factor and centered AA scores were included as a covariate. 
Accuracy Task Analyses 
 Correlations. For each condition, correlations were conducted between participants’ BDI-II 
scores and their overall accuracy rate (expressed as a percent) on the accuracy task as well as specific 
accuracy for each of the five emotions (see Table 11 for correlations between questionnaire scores and 
indices of accuracy). In general, greater endorsement of depressive symptoms was associated with 




cognitive load but not when they were given a distraction or neutral rumination induction. Interestingly, 
for participants in the neutral rumination condition, higher levels of depressive symptomatology were 
associated with greater accuracy for angry and sad faces.   
 Do participants who receive a cognitive load perform similarly to those who receive a rumination 
induction? To address this question, a mixed-design GLM analysis was conducted examining 
performance on the accuracy task for the rumination, distraction, and cognitive load conditions. As 
noted above, Model 1 was utilized for this analysis with percent accuracy on the task as the dependent 
variable. Results indicated that participants’ accuracy differed across the five emotions, F(4, 123) = 
58.13, p < .001 (see Table 12 for results of the follow-up paired samples t-test). The Contrast 2 main 
effect was also significant, F(1, 123) = 7.38, p = .008, such that participants in the rumination condition 
were more accurate than those in the cognitive load condition. The main effect of the AA covariate was 
also significant, F(1, 123) = 4.19, p = .04, such that greater anxiety was associated with poorer accuracy. 
The BDI-II main effect, F(1, 123) = 4.08, p = .05, and the Contrast 1 main effect, F(1, 123) = 8.07, p = .005, 
were both significant. However, they were qualified by the two-way BDI-II X Contrast 1 interaction, F(1, 
123) = 7.95, p = .006.  None of the other main effects or interactions were significant (ps > .10).  
Simple slopes analyses were conducted to interpret the significant BDI-II X Contrast 1 
interaction. Specifically, two separate regression analyses were conducted to examine the simple 
Contrast 1 effect at high and low levels of BDI-II (represented in Figure 8). As participants’ accuracy 
across the five emotions did not differ between the three conditions as a function of level of dysphoria, 
percent accuracy was collapsed across the different emotions. Participants who endorsed more 
depressive symptoms were less accurate on this task when given either a rumination induction or a 
cognition load than when given a distraction induction, B = -.12, t(126) = -4.31, p < .001. The Contrast 1 




 Participants’ reaction times on this task were also examined using a mixed-design GLM. Again, 
Model 1 was employed for this analysis with participants’ mean reaction time as the dependent 
measure. In general, participants’ reaction times across the five emotions differed, F(4, 123) = 66.88, p < 
.001 (see Table 13 for results of the follow-up paired-samples t-test). The BDI-II X Contrast 1 interaction 
was marginally significant, F(1, 123) = 3.04, p = .08. None of the other main effects or interactions was 
significant (ps > .16).  
 Simple slopes analyses were conducted to examine the BDI-II X Contrast 1 interaction 
(represented in Figure 9). As with the previous simple slopes analysis, response times across the five 
emotions were collapsed. Participants who endorsed fewer depressive symptoms exhibited slower 
response times when they received either a rumination induction or cognitive load than when given a 
distraction induction, B = 269.87, t(126) = 2.10, p = .04. However, the Contrast 1 effect was not 
significant for those who endorsed greater depressive symptoms, B = -.71.11, t(126) = -.54, p = .59.  
Do the rumination and neutral rumination inductions have differing effects on participants?  
To address this question, a mixed-design GLM analysis was conducted examining performance 
on the accuracy task for the rumination and neutral rumination conditions. Model 2 was employed for 
this analysis with percent accuracy as the dependent measure. Again, participants’ results across the five 
emotions differed, F(4, 82) = 42.36, p < .001 (see Table 14 for results of the follow-up paired-samples t-
test). The main effect of the AA covariate was significant, F(4, 82) = 5.88, p = .02, such that greater 
anxiety was associated with poorer accuracy. The two-way BDI-II X Condition interaction was also 
significant, F(4, 82) = 14.82, p < .001. None of the other main effects or interactions were significant (ps 
> .10).  
 Simple slopes analyses were conducted to interpret the significant BDI-II X Condition interaction 
(represented in Figure 10). Again, as participants’ accuracy across the five emotions did not differ 




depressive symptoms were less accurate on this task when given a rumination induction than when 
given a neutral rumination induction, B = -.04, t(82) = -3.03, p = .003. For those who endorsed fewer 
depressive symptoms, they were more accurate when given a rumination induction than when given a 
neutral rumination induction, B =.03, t(82) = 2.36, p = .02. 
 Participants’ reaction times on this task were also examined using a mixed-design GLM. Again, 
Model 2 was employed with mean reaction time as the dependent measure. The main effect of Emotion 
was significant, F(4, 82) = 35.11, p < .001 (see Table 15 for the results of the follow-up paired-samples t-
test). None of the other main effects or interactions were significant (ps > .14).  
Bias Task Analyses 
 Correlations. For each condition, correlations were conducted between participants’ BDI-II 
scores and their overall intensity ratings on the bias task as well as specific ratings for the four emotions 
(see Table 16 for correlations between questionnaire scores and indices of perceived intensity. For the 
cognitive load condition, greater endorsement of depressive symptoms was marginally associated with 
greater accuracy for happy faces, r(40) = .30, p = .06. None of the other correlations were significant (ps 
> .21).   
 Do participants who receive a cognitive load perform similarly to those who receive a rumination 
induction? A mixed-design GLM analysis was conducted examining performance on the bias task for the 
rumination, distraction, and cognitive load conditions. Model 1 was employed for this analysis with 
participants’ emotional intensity ratings as the dependent measure. Results indicated that participants’ 
emotional intensity ratings differed across the four emotions, F(3, 123) = 55.19, p < .001 (see Table 17 
for results of the follow-up paired samples t-test). The Contrast 1 main effect was also significant, F(1, 
123) = 6.22, p = .01, such that participants in the rumination and load conditions exhibited greater 




was also significant, F(1, 123) = 4.63, p = .03, such that greater anxiety was associated with higher 
emotional intensity ratings.  None of the other main effects or interactions were significant (ps > .27).  
 Participants’ response times on this task were also examined using a mixed-design GLM. Again, 
Model 1 was employed with mean reaction time as the dependent measure. The main effect of Emotion 
was significant, F(3, 123) = 20.76, p < .001 (see Table 18 for the results of the follow-up paired-samples 
t-test). None of the other main effects or interactions were significant (ps > .12) except for the BDI-II X 
Contrast 1 interaction, F(1, 123) = 5.68, p = .02. 
The Contrast 1 X BDI-II interaction was examined using simple slopes analyses (represented in 
Figure 11). As participants’ response times across the four emotions did not differ between the three 
conditions, response times were collapsed across the different emotions. For those endorsing greater 
depressive symptoms, participants in the rumination or cognitive load condition were quicker to 
respond than those in the distraction condition, B = -273.70, t(123) = -2.04, p = .04. No group differences 
were observed for those endorsing fewer depressive symptoms, B = 186.70, t(123) = 1.42, p = .16.  
Do the rumination and neutral rumination inductions have differing effects on participants? 
 A mixed-design GLM analysis was conducted examining performance on the bias task for the 
rumination and neutral rumination conditions. Model 2 was used for this analysis with emotional 
intensity ratings as the dependent measure. Again, participants’ emotional intensity ratings differed 
across the four emotions, F(3, 82) = 45.38, p < .001 (see Table 19 for results of the follow-up paired-
samples t-test). None of the other main effects or interactions were significant (ps > .10).   
 Participants’ reaction times on this task were also examined using a mixed-design GLM. Again, 
Model 2 was employed with mean reaction time as the dependent measure. The main effect of Emotion 
was significant, F(4, 82) = 35.11, p < .001 (see Table 20 for the results of the follow-up paired-samples t-





Chimera Task Analyses 
 Correlations. For each condition, correlations were conducted between participants’ BDI-II 
scores and their overall intensity ratings on the chimera task as well as specific ratings for the four 
emotions (see Table 21 for correlations between questionnaire scores and indices of perceived 
intensity). Results indicated that BDI-II scores were not correlated with emotional intensity ratings for 
the chimera task (ps > .15).  
 Do participants who receive a cognitive load perform similarly to those who receive a rumination 
induction? A mixed-design GLM analysis was conducted examining performance on the chimera task for 
the rumination, distraction, and cognitive load conditions. Model 1 was utilized for this analysis with 
participants’ emotional intensity ratings as the dependent measure. Again, participants’ intensity ratings 
varied across the four emotions, F(3, 123) = 100.24, p < .001 (see Table 22 for results of the follow-up 
paired samples t-test). The Contrast 1 main effect was also significant, F(1, 123) = 5.57, p = .02, such that 
participants in the rumination and load conditions tended to rate the stimuli as more emotionally 
intense than those in the distraction condition. The main effect of the AA covariate was marginally 
significant, F(1, 123) = 3,83, p = .05, such that higher levels of anxiety were associated with greater 
emotional intensity ratings. None of the other main effects or interactions were significant (ps > .32).  
 Participants’ response times on this task were also examined using a mixed-design GLM. Model 
1 was employed with mean reaction time as the dependent measure. The main effect of Emotion was 
significant, F(3, 123) = 37.43, p < .001 (see Table 23 for the results of the follow-up paired-samples t-
test). None of the other main effects or interactions were significant (ps > .15) except for the BDI-II X 
Contrast 1 interaction, F(1, 123) = 6.68, p = .01. 
Simple slopes analyses were used to examine the Contrast 1 X BDI-II interaction (represented in 
Figure 12). As participants’ response times across the four emotions did not differ between the three 




depressive symptoms, participants in the rumination or cognitive load condition were quicker to 
respond than those in the distraction condition, B = -326.98, t(123) = 6.85, p = .01. No group differences 
were observed for those endorsing fewer depressive symptoms, B = 143.41, t(123) = 1.17, p = .24. 
Do the rumination and neutral rumination inductions have differing effects on participants? 
 To address this question, a mixed-design GLM analysis was conducted examining performance 
on the chimera task for the rumination and neutral rumination conditions. Model 2 was employed with 
participants’ emotional intensity ratings as the dependent measure. Once again, participants’ emotional 
intensity ratings differed across the four emotions, F(3, 82) = 77.03, p < .001 (see Table 24 for results of 
the follow-up paired-samples t-test). None of the other main effects or interactions were significant (ps 
> .19).   
 Participants’ reaction times on this task were examined using a mixed-design GLM. Again, Model 
2 was used for this analysis with mean reaction time as the dependent measure. The main effect of 
Emotion was significant, F(3, 82) = 53.44, p < .001 (see Table 25 for the results of the follow-up paired-
samples t-test). The Condition main effect was marginally significant, F(1, 82) = 3.70, p = .06, such that 
participants in the rumination condition were quicker to respond than those in the load condition. The 
main effect of the anxiety covariate was also marginally significant, F(1, 82) = 2.98, p = .09, such that 
higher levels of anxiety were associated with faster response times. None of the other main effects or 
interactions were significant (ps > .14). 
Discussion 
 The main goals of this study were to replicate findings from Study 1 and to examine a possible 
mechanism by which rumination affects facial emotion recognition. Briefly, results from Study 1 
indicated that participants endorsing greater levels of dysphoria were less accurate on a facial 
expression identification task when they received a rumination induction but not when they received a 




affected by the type of induction given. Findings from Study 2 were consistent with these results. 
Specifically, both correlation and regression analyses provided evidence in support of the 
aforementioned relationship between dysphoria, rumination, and emotion recognition accuracy. As with 
Study 1, poorer accuracy by dysphoric participants who received a rumination induction was not 
attributable to a faster pace of responding (which, presumably, would be associated with a more 
reckless style of responding).  
To a lesser degree, results from Study 1 provided some evidence to support the hypothesis that 
the combined influence of dysphoria and induced rumination would translate into greater perceived 
negativity of emotional facial expressions. However, the positive correlation between endorsement of 
depressive symptoms and perceived intensity of anger and fear for participants who received a 
rumination induction was not replicated in Study 2. Similarly, the interaction between dysphoria and 
induction received for the chimera task, which suggested that dysphoric participants perceived more 
emotional intensity when asked to ruminate while non-dysphoric participants tended to perceive less 
emotional intensity when asked to ruminate, was not found in Study 2. Taken together, greater 
confidence can be placed in results regarding accuracy of emotion recognition than in those for biased 
emotional perception.  
 Rumination appears to negatively impact accuracy of facial emotion recognition in dysphoric 
individuals, but how does the ruminative process exert its pernicious influence? I hypothesized that the 
mechanism underlying this relationship is the load that rumination places on cognitive resources. To test 
this hypothesis, Study 2 included a condition which employed the use of a cognitive load (i.e., rehearsing 
a 9-digit number over the course of the task). Correlational analyses revealed a negative relationship 
between level of dysphoria and emotion recognition accuracy for both the rumination and cognitive 
load conditions but not the distraction condition. Furthermore, subsequent analyses indicated that 




induction or cognitive load in contrast to those who received a distraction induction. Accuracy of 
participants reporting fewer depressive symptoms was not affected by the type of induction (or 
cognitive load) that they received. This interaction is coupled with the finding that the performance of 
participants in the rumination and cognitive load conditions did not differ significantly from each other. 
These results are consistent with the rumination-as-cognitive-load hypothesis. Interestingly, response 
time analyses indicate that non-dysphoric participants took longer to respond in the rumination and 
cognitive load conditions compared to the distraction condition. No difference in response times across 
conditions was observed for the dysphoric participants. One interpretation of this finding is that non-
dysphoric participants may be compensating for the increased demand on cognitive resources whereas 
dysphoric participants are not using extra time to process the information before making a judgment. 
However, it is important to note that this finding was not demonstrated in Study 1 (which found that 
dysphoric participants were slower to respond regardless of the condition) and, therefore, should be 
interpreted with some caution. 
 Although the results support the claim that the ruminative process has a deleterious effect on 
mental resources of dysphoric individuals, it is important to consider the alternative possibility that the 
effects of rumination on cognitive processing are due to the associated negative mood. Indeed, 
rumination can serve to exacerbate and prolong a negative mood state (see Thomsen, 2006). In effect, 
rumination can act similarly to a negative mood induction in that it merely results in negative content 
being more salient for dysphoric individuals (Tse & Bond, 2004). By definition, dysphoric rumination is a 
process of inward focus on one’s mood and the causes and consequences of it. This process should 
prime individuals to be more attentive to additional negative content. Indeed, widely used negative 
mood induction procedures employ negative thoughts to achieve the desired effect or at least enhance 
it. For example, participants may be asked to repeat negative self-referent statements (e.g., “I feel 




Heimberg, Abramowitz, & Bertram, 2006; Segal, Gemar, & Williams, 1999). In effect, these procedures, 
especially the Velten mood induction procedure (VMIP), are similar to the ruminative process and 
previous studies have demonstrated that depressed participants’ cognitive processes are more 
negatively biased after receiving a negative VMIP (e.g., Teasdale & Fogarty, 1979). The idea that one’s 
negative thoughts can result in a cascade of additional negative thoughts is central to cognitive theories 
of depression (e.g., Beck, 1967; Ingram, 1984; Teasdale, 1983). 
 Of relevance to this question, an important feature of the cognitive load task employed in this 
study was its emotional neutrality. Specifically, the digit-memorization task kept participants cognitively 
busy without employing negative content. Thus, this cognitive load task mimics the ruminative process 
while removing the potential priming influence of cycling through negative thoughts. It bears repeating 
that since the emotion recognition accuracy of dysphoric participants who received a rumination 
induction was similar to those who received a cognitive load, the results of this study support the 
hypothesis that cognitive load serves as an underlying mechanism of rumination. On the other hand, 
comparisons between the original rumination induction and the neutral rumination induction may 
suggest that cognitive load might not be the only mechanism. Briefly, the statements employed in the 
original rumination induction were revised so as to minimize any negative connotations to form the 
neutral rumination induction. Results from Study 2 indicated that participants did not perform 
comparably in the two conditions. Specifically, dysphoric participants were less accurate when they 
received the rumination induction which raises the possibility that negative affect also plays a role in the 
relationship between dysphoria and poorer emotion recognition accuracy. Perhaps by de-emphasizing 
negative aspects of self-focused thinking, the neutral rumination induction may have induced a more 
adaptive form of self-reflection. Indeed, researchers have found that focusing on positive self-content 
(e.g., Mor & Winquist, 2002) or employing a more concrete, experiential form of rumination (Watkins, 




condition, greater endorsement of depressive symptoms was associated with greater accuracy for 
certain emotions (i.e., anger & sadness). While this hypothesis remains a viable and interesting one, it is 
important to not overstate these findings. The original rumination induction has been employed 
extensively whereas further work needs to be done to validate the neutral rumination induction.  As 
noted previously, analyses involving the neutral rumination condition were exploratory in nature.  
As in Study 1, participants’ performance across the emotions did not differ as a function of their 
level of dysphoria in Study 2. However, more general differences in emotion perception were observed. 
Again, the most consistent finding was that happiness was typically perceived differently than the other 
emotions (fear, anger, sadness), even neutral. Happiness was identified more accurately and perceived 
as less intense. Participants also responded to happy items more quickly. Again, these findings are likely 
attributable to the fact that happiness was the only positive-valence emotion. Differences were 
observed between the other emotions, but they were not as consistent or prominent.   
 In summary, results from both studies suggest that induced rumination is associated with 
decreased emotion recognition accuracy, but only for participants reporting greater depressive 
symptoms. Furthermore, the current study provided evidence to support the claim that cognitive load is 
an important mechanism that may underlie the effects of rumination on dysphoric individuals. 
Dysphoric participants’ poorer accuracy when under the influence of rumination or cognitive load does 
not appear to be attributable to their pace of responding. Furthermore, dysphoric and/or ruminative 
effects on perceived intensity of facial emotions were less robust than findings for accuracy. Finally, 
exploratory analyses suggested a possible role for negative affect in addition to cognitive load, but 






 According to Nolen-Hoeksema’s (1987) responses styles theory, rumination is conceptualized as 
an emotion regulation strategy which involves a repetitive analysis aimed at gaining a better 
understanding of one’s depressed mood. On the surface, such a strategy would appear to be consonant 
with cognitive therapies and, therefore, be associated with positive outcomes. On the contrary, 
rumination appears to have an unintended, paradoxical effect. For example, individuals who respond to 
their dysphoria by dwelling on and trying to understand their low mood state have been shown to be 
more pessimistic or negative in their outlook compared to their counterparts who respond with 
distraction (e.g., Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Lyubomirsky et al., 1999; Spasojevic & Alloy, 
2001). Joorman and colleagues (2006), using a dot probe task, found that depressed participants who 
reported a greater tendency to brood (i.e., ruminate) exhibited an attentional bias for sad faces. 
Rumination has also been shown to be associated with greater recall of negative autobiographical 
memories in dysphoric participants (Lyubomirsky et al., 1998). Rather than being a beneficial strategy to 
regulate one’s mood, rumination appears to play an important role in the development and course of 
depressive symptoms in part through its influence on cognitive processes.  
 The present investigation focused on one particular cognitive process that has been closely 
linked with a depressed mood state, namely, emotion recognition. Briefly, for the most part, previous 
studies have found evidence to support either a general impairment (e.g., Asthana et al., 1998; Rubinow 
& Post, 1992) or negative bias (e.g., Bouhuys et al., 1999; Bouhuys et al., 1997; Gur et al., 1992; Hale, 
1998) in depressed participants. While there is disagreement about the exact nature of the relationship 
between emotion recognition and depression, the bulk of the literature supports the conclusion that 
this cognitive process is influenced by a depressive state. What is less clear, however, is how 
depression/dysphoria exerts its influence on emotion recognition. The possibility of rumination as a 




demonstrated rumination’s role as a mediator between certain risk factors and the eventual 
development of depressive symptoms (Spasojevic & Alloy, 2001).  
Although there has been considerable research on both emotion recognition and rumination 
and their link to depressive symptoms, the relationship between these two variables has not been 
extensively studied. In fact, to the best of my knowledge, only one study has examined the links 
between depression, rumination, and emotion recognition. Briefly, in a sample of depressed patients, 
the researchers found that greater levels of rumination were associated with more pronounced negative 
biases in judgments of facial expression (Raes et al., 2006). Their findings suggest that rumination may, 
indeed, be the mechanism by which depression impacts this particular cognitive process. However, 
certain design elements of their study serve to limit their results. First, by relying on participants’ self-
reported ruminative tendencies, their findings do not address the question of causality or directionality. 
Second, the stimuli used in their study were simplistic line drawings which inherently lack realism and do 
not capture the subtle nuances of human faces. Third, Raes and colleagues did not include a control 
group in their study.  
One of the main goals of the present investigation was to build on the results of Raes and 
colleagues’ study by addressing the aforementioned limitations. Specifically, the present set of studies 
(1) employed an induction methodology to empirically test the effects of rumination versus distraction 
(as opposed to relying on self-reported tendencies to ruminate); (2) used stimuli that are more 
ecologically valid and developed according to a rigorous and well-established protocol; and (3) included 
participants reporting a range of depressive symptoms (including those who endorse few symptoms). 
These study design elements allowed for a stronger test of the relationships between depressed mood, 
rumination, and facial emotion recognition. In Study 1, I found that greater endorsement of depressive 
symptoms was associated with poorer accuracy in identifying the emotion portrayed in facial 




exhibited for either dysphoric participants who received a distraction induction or participants with 
fewer depressive symptoms (regardless of the induction). This finding was replicated in Study 2 and 
provides evidence to support the specificity of the relationship between dysphoria, emotion recognition, 
and rumination. That is, previous studies examining the effect of rumination on various cognitive 
processes have resulted in mixed findings. Some researchers have found that rumination influences 
performance in an unselected (i.e., participants were not specifically targeted based on their level of 
dysphoria) sample (e.g., Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990; Trask & Sigmon, 1999) which would suggest 
that rumination, rather than dysphoria, is the key factor. However, others have found that the 
ruminative process only impacted the performance of dysphoric participants (e.g., Lyubomirsky et al., 
1998; Lyubomirsky et al., 2003; Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995) which would suggest that the 
presence of both variables are required to elicit the effect in question. The results of the present study 
are consistent with the latter camp.  
 While the results of these aforementioned studies may appear to be incongruent, a closer look 
at their aims and results reveal a more nuanced picture. That is, studies involving unselected samples 
typically involved one of two approaches. One of the approaches was investigating the effects of 
rumination on changes in mood (e.g., Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990; Trask & Sigmon, 1999). 
Broadly, these researchers demonstrated that rumination can maintain a negative mood state whereas 
distraction can improve it (although a review by Thomsen, 2006, concluded that rumination may also 
exacerbate a negative mood state). The other approach involved examining ruminative tendencies as a 
mediator between risk factors and depressive symptoms. For example, Weinstock and Whisman (2007) 
found that rumination mediated the relationship between reassurance-seeking and depressive 
symptoms. Similarly, Spasojevic and Alloy (2001) found that rumination mediated links between various 
vulnerability factors (e.g., negative cognitive style, self-criticism, and neediness) and eventual 




ruminative effects, they do not speak towards possible reciprocal (i.e., the effects of dysphoria on 
ruminative tendencies) or synergistic effects. They also do not examine rumination’s effect on specific 
cognitive processes.  
 Studies investigating rumination in selected samples (either sub-threshold dysphoric or clinically 
depressed participants) are typically interested in examining the effects of rumination on factors other 
than mood. Specifically, researchers have demonstrated that rumination is associated with cognitive 
(e.g., autobiographical memory; Sutherland & Bryant, 2007) and behavioural (e.g., support-seeking; 
Nolen-Hoeksema & Davis, 1999) effects in those experiencing depressed mood. Taken together with 
results from non-selected samples, a clearer picture begins to emerge in which rumination maintains or 
exacerbates depressed mood (either experimentally induced or naturally occurring) and, when both 
factors are present, additional processes which have been shown to exacerbate the depressive state or 
increase vulnerability for a relapse are set into motion. 
  In Study 2, using a cognitive load manipulation, I investigated the hypothesis that rumination 
impacts emotion recognition by taxing cognitive resources. Previous studies have provided evidence to 
suggest that rumination is an effortful process which slows down processing of other tasks (e.g., 
Lyubomirsky et al., 2003). Furthermore, while emotion recognition appears to be a relatively automatic 
process, Tracy and Robins (2008) demonstrated that it is not wholly automatic and, therefore, is 
vulnerable to disruption. Results from this study suggested that, in terms of emotion recognition 
accuracy, participants’ performance in the rumination and cognitive load conditions closely mirrored 
one another. That is, analyses revealed that accuracy of dysphoric participants did not differ between 
the rumination and cognitive load conditions and, collectively, they were less accurate than their 
counterparts in the distraction condition. These findings are consistent with the rumination-as-




 As discussed previously, an alternative explanation would be that rumination, which involves an 
inward focus on negative content, acts as a sad mood induction and, instead, this mood induction is the 
key mechanism underlying ruminative effects. On the one hand, the aforementioned results are not 
supportive of this hypothesis as the cognitive load employed in Study 2 was neutral in valence. On the 
other hand, findings from an exploratory condition hint at a possible role of induced negative affect. 
Specifically, a new type of rumination induction (neutral rumination) was developed for this study in 
which the induction statements were denuded of negative connotations and allusions. Analyses 
comparing performance in the neutral rumination condition to the original rumination condition 
indicated that dysphoric participants in the former were more accurate than those in the latter. While 
this result is suggestive of a role for induced negative affect, it is important to note that the neutral 
rumination induction needs to be further studied before firmer conclusions can be drawn. 
 The possible role of induced negative affect is also intriguing because it could help explain why 
rumination impacts dysphoric but not euthymic individuals. By definition, rumination involves an inward 
focus. Therefore, dysphoric individuals would focus on content associated with their low mood whereas 
euthymic individuals would, presumably, focus on material of a less negative nature. As a result, only 
those focusing on negative content would be induced to feel sad or depressed. A corollary question, one 
more relevant to the present study, is how the rumination-as-cognitive-load hypothesis addresses this 
issue. Again, returning to the definition of rumination is informative. Rumination is defined as an inward 
focus on the possible causes and consequences of one’s negative mood state. Therefore, euthymic 
individuals, presumably, have relatively less material with which to ruminate compared to those 
experiencing dysphoria. Employing a broader definition of rumination to capture an inward focus on 
one’s current mood state, regardless of valence, can also be informative. Existing research suggests that 
content is more easily recalled when it is emotional rather than neutral (see review by Buchanan & 




negative material is more memorable than positive material (e.g., Charles, Mather, & Carstensen, 2003; 
Ortony, Turner,& Antos, 1983). Also, negative memories tend to remembered as more vivid than 
positive ones (e.g., Dewhurst & Parry, 2000; Ochsner, 2000). As such, an individual who has more salient 
and readily accessible negative content to process would be more at risk of falling into a ruminative 
cycle than one who has more neutral and positive thoughts on their mind. This effect would be further 
exacerbated by the fact that depressed individuals are even more likely to display a negative recall bias 
(Matt, Vazquez, & Campbell, 1992). Dysphoric individuals’ greater susceptibility to engaging in 
rumination is coupled with greater reliance on depressive schematic processing when cognitive 
resources are strained by their self-focused attention (Flory, Raikkonen, Matthews, & Owens, 2000). For 
euthymic individuals, it follows that having fewer salient and accessible negative thoughts would 
translate to a lesser strain on cognitive resources.    
 The main finding that the specific combination of dysphoria and induced rumination was 
associated with poorer accuracy in identifying facial expressions (in comparison to dysphoria and 
induced distraction or non-dysphoria and either induction) also has implications for the emotion 
recognition literature. As noted previously, results from existing studies which examined the 
relationship between depression/dysphoria and emotion recognition have been mixed. The results of 
the current study are more in line with those that have found a general (i.e., not emotion-specific or 
mood-congruent) impairment of facial emotion recognition in depressed or dysphoric participants (e.g., 
Asthana et al., 1998; Rubinow & Post, 1992) rather than those that support a negative bias (e.g., 
Bouhuys et al., 1999; Bouhuys et al., 1997; Gur et al., 1992; Hale, 1998). Of course, in the present study, 
dysphoria in isolation was not sufficient to elicit poorer accuracy. Instead, it was at the intersection of 
higher levels of depressive symptoms and induced rumination that poorer emotion recognition accuracy 
was observed. This finding is consistent with past studies which have found that rumination mediated 




2001; Weinstock & Whisman, 2007) and cognitive impairments (e.g., Lyubomirsky et al., 1998; 
Lyubomirsky et al., 2003; Sutherland & Bryant, 2007). Furthermore, Raes and colleagues (2006) did not 
find a direct relationship between depressive symptoms and negatively biased ratings of facial 
expressions in their sample of depressed patients, but, instead, demonstrated a positive association 
between trait rumination and negative ratings. Moving forward, future studies which examine 
synergistic influences of depressive symptoms and rumination, rather than individual effects, on 
cognitive functioning may help to clarify past disparate findings.   
 Although the present study demonstrated a link between dysphoria and impaired identification 
of emotional facial expressions, a similar relationship for biased emotion recognition was not firmly 
established. Certain findings from the bias and chimera tasks from Study 1 supported the hypothesis 
that dysphoric ruminators would perceive emotional facial expressions more negatively, but these 
results were not replicated in Study 2. Furthermore, as discussed previously, negative bias can be 
defined not only as perceiving greater negativity, but also as greater accuracy for negative stimuli. 
Employing this definition, results from the Accuracy task also did not support a negative bias. Therefore, 
the present study was not able to provide strong evidence of a negative emotion recognition bias in 
dysphoric individuals. This result differs from past studies that have demonstrated such a negative bias. 
Briefly, these studies found that a negative bias in depressed patients was associated with greater 
severity and poorer outcomes especially if the stimuli were made to look less straightforward (e.g., 
Bouhuys et al., 1999; Hale, 1998; Hale et al., 1998). Of course, as discussed previously, problems with 
respect to the realism of the stimuli serve to limit conclusions drawn from these results. Some past 
studies have also found evidence for emotion-specific biases (e.g., Gur et al., 1992; Joorman & Gotlib, 
2006; Kan et al., 2004; Mendlewicz et al., 2005), but they have largely been inconsistent. Therefore, the 
existing evidence does not strongly favour the idea of negatively biased emotion identification (as 




Limitations of the Present Study 
 Tennen, Hall, and Affleck (1995) noted that the terms depression, syndromal depression, 
dysphoria, and major depression are often used interchangeably or without key distinctions made 
between them. In the present investigation, the term “dysphoria” was used to denote individuals 
experiencing subclinical levels of depression, not people who are clinically depressed. The appropriate 
term was also employed when reviewing past studies. Still, these results do not directly speak toward 
emotion recognition abilities and ruminative effects for clinically depressed individuals. However, as 
mentioned previously, a great number of dysphoric individuals go on to develop full-blown depression 
(Fergusson et al., 2005), and thus, investigations using this population are of practical, as well as 
theoretical, value. 
 The current set of studies involved stimuli that were not employed in previous research. Instead, 
the photographs that were used were developed specifically for this investigation. Of course, when 
novel stimuli are utilized, the question of validity is rightfully raised. For example, are the results simply 
attributable to artifacts or quirks of the photographs? Do the photographs portray the emotion that was 
intended? To address questions of validity, certain steps were taken. First, the stimuli were developed 
according to the gold standard criteria developed by Ekman and Friesen (1978). Second, two trained 
coders reviewed the stimuli in order to ensure their fidelity to the criteria. Therefore, greater confidence 
can be placed in the veracity of the stimuli.  
Directions for Future Research 
 In the present investigation, one of the main findings was that dysphoric participants who were 
presented with a cognitive load performed similarly to their counterparts who were induced to ruminate 
which suggest that depletion of mental resources is likely a key factor in explaining how rumination 
influences emotion recognition. While the finding that rumination only affects the performance of 




to hinder the accuracy of dysphoric but not control participants. Response time analyses suggest that 
this result may be due to non-dysphoric participants compensating for the increased strain on resources 
by taking greater time to respond. The possibility that dysphoric individuals are less adept at adapting to 
the demands of the environment is an intriguing one and deserves further investigation. For example, 
future studies could examine whether explicitly instructing dysphoric participants under cognitive load 
to take more time to respond would improve their accuracy rates.  
 Another interesting direction for future research would be to examine alternative coping 
strategies to distraction. Theoretically, distraction disrupts the ruminative cycle which, in turn, reduces 
the amount of cognitive load. From a therapeutic standpoint, this strategy is beneficial in the short-term 
as it allows for a potential boost to one’s mood as well as the opportunity to return to problem with 
greater cognitive resources and, perhaps, a fresh perspective. Recently, researchers have begun to turn 
their attention to exploring alternative methods to disrupting rumination such as mindfulness-based 
approaches (e.g., Broderick, 2005; Jain et al., 2007; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001) and distanced-recall of 
painful memories (e.g., Kross, Ayduk, & Mischel, 2005). These approaches may seem paradoxical as the 
former encourages greater awareness of one’s cognitions and the latter specifically involves recalling 
details of negative memories. Similarly, the most prevalent form of therapy at present, cognitive 
behavioural therapy, also involves fostering greater attention to and awareness of negative cognitions. 
However, Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, and Lyubomirsky (2008) noted that these interventions may be 
effective counters to rumination because they provide an explanation as to why one is feeling down and 
depressed and strategies to challenge or reduce the emotional intensity of negative memories and 
cognitions. Therefore, the current line of research can be expanded by examining whether these 





 Future studies can also further dissect the process of rumination. The present study examined a 
mechanism, cognitive load, by which rumination influences other cognitive processes. While cognitive 
load certainly appears to play an important role in the relationship between dysphoria and emotion 
recognition, other factors may be present as well. For example, as discussed at greater length above, 
follow-up studies can investigate the possible contributory role of induced negative affect. A similar, 
complementary direction would be to examine cognitive processes that underlie the process of 
rumination. A defining characteristic of rumination is its persistence. As such, deficits in executive 
functioning may be associated with tendencies toward rumination. For example, studies have 
demonstrated impairments in inhibitory control in both depressed participants (Langenecker, 
Bieliauskas, Rapport, Zubieta, Wilde, & Berent, 2005) and trait ruminators (Davis & Nolen-Hoeksema, 
2000).  
 Finally, additional research should also focus addressing issues of generalizability. Indeed, a 
follow-up study can examine whether the results of the present study are applicable to a clinically 
depressed sample. Additional studies can also investigate the effects of dysphoria and rumination on 
other types of emotional stimuli. The present study employed pictures of real people displaying various 
emotional facial expressions. While the stimuli used in this study represented an upgrade in terms of 
ecological validity over the schematic line drawings used in some past studies in this line of research, 
they are, nonetheless, static in nature. Therefore, future studies can investigate dysphoric ruminators’ 
performance on a task that employs dynamic stimuli that more closely resembles real-life social 
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For the next few minutes, try your best to focus your attention on each of the ideas on the following 
pages. Read each item slowly and silently to yourself. As you read the items, use your imagination and 
concentration to focus your mind on each of the ideas. Spend a few moments visualizing and 
concentrating on each item. Please continue until the experimenter returns. 
Think about the physical sensations you feel in your body 
Think about your character and who you strive to be 
Think about the degree of clarity in your thinking right now 
Think about why you react the way you do 
Think about the way you feel inside 
Think about the possible consequences of your current mental state 
Think about how similar/different you are relative to other people 
Think about what it would be like if your present feelings lasted 
Think about why things turn out the way they do 
Think about trying to understand your feelings 
Think about how awake/tired you feel now 
Think about the amount of tension in your muscles 
Think about whether you are fulfilled 
Think about your physical appearance 
Think about whether you feel stressed right now 
Think about the long-term goals you have set 
Think about the amount of certainty you feel 
Think about your present feelings of fatigue/energy 
Think about possible explanations for your physical sensations 




Think about the level of motivation you feel right now 
Think about the degree of helplessness you feel 
Think about the degree of calmness/restlessness you feel 
Think about the possible consequences of the way you feel 
Think about what your feelings might mean 
Think about how sad/happy you are feeling 
Think about the expectations your family has for you 
Think about why your body feels this way 
Think about why you get this way sometimes 
Think about how passive/active you feel 
Think about what people notice about your personality 
Think about the kind of student you are and wish you were 
Think about how weak/strong your body feels now 
Think about the degree of relaxation/agitation you feel 
Think about the kind of person you think you should be 
Think about the degree of control you feel right now 
Think about what would happen if your current physical state lasted 
Think about sitting down and analyzing your personality 
Think about why you turned out this way 
Think about the things that are most important in your life 
Think about how quick/slow your thinking is right now 
Think about the degree of decisiveness you feel 
Think about trying to understand who you are 
Think about how you feel about your friendships 







For the next few minutes, try your best to focus your attention on each of the ideas on the following 
pages. Read each item slowly and silently to yourself. As you read the items, use your imagination and 
concentration to focus your mind on each of the ideas. Spend a few moments visualizing and 
concentrating on each item. Please continue until the experimenter returns. 
Think about and imagine a boat slowly crossing the Atlantic 
Think about the layout of a typical classroom 
Think about the shape of a large black umbrella 
Think about the movement of an electric fan on a warm day 
Think about raindrops sliding down a windowpane 
Think about a double-decker bus driving down a street 
Think about and picture a full moon on a clear night 
Think about clouds forming in the sky 
Think about the layout of the local shopping center 
Think about and imagine a plane flying overhead 
Think about fire darting around a log in a fire-place 
Think about and concentrate on the expression on the face of the Mona Lisa 
Think about a clown putting on his or her make-up 
Think about two birds sitting on a tree branch 
Think about the shadow of a stop sign 
Think about the layout of the local post office 
Think about the structure of a high-rise office building 
Think about and picture the Eiffel Tower 
Think about and imagine a truckload of watermelons 




Think about the "man in the moon" 
Think about the shape of the continent of Africa 
Think about a band playing outside 
Think about a group of polar bears fishing in a stream 
Think about the shape of the torch on the Statue of Liberty 
Think about the shape of the state of Michigan 
Think about the way the ocean looks at sunset 
Think about the layout of the Diag 
Think about a train stopped at a station 
Think about a lone cactus in the desert 
Think about the shape of the country of Italy 
Think about a row of shampoo bottles on display 
Think about a gas station on the side of a highway 
Think about the fuzz on the shell of a coconut 
Think about the Presidents' faces on Mount Rushmore 
Think about and picture Mickey Mouse’s face 
Think about a band playing "The Star Spangled Banner" 
Think about the shape of a cello 
Think about the layout of a computer keyboard 
Think about the shape of the United States 
Think about the baggage claim area at the airport 
Think about the shape of a tuba 
Think about the shape of a baseball glove 
Think about a freshly painted door 





Neutral Rumination Induction – Revised Statements 
Original Phrase Revised Phrase 
Why your body feels this way The way your body feels 
The amount of tension in your muscles The way your muscles feel 
Whether you feel stressed right now Whether you feel stressed or at ease right now 
The possible consequences of the way you feel The possible outcomes of the way you feel 
The possible consequences of your current mental 
state 
The possible outcomes of your current mental 
state 
The kind of person you think you should be The kind of person you want to be 
Why you react the way you do The way you tend to react 
Why things turn out the way they do The way things tend to turn out 
Why you turned out this way Where you are in your life and how you got there 
Why you get this way sometimes 








Study 1: Correlations between questionnaire (BDI-II, AA) scores and indices of accuracy for rumination 




 BDI-II AA BDI-II AA 
Anger -.40** -.38** -.01 -.03 
Fear -.50** -.44** .03 .05 
Sadness -.41** -.41** .03 .00 
Happiness -.32* -.23 .14 -.04 
Neutral -.22 -.25 -.12 .00 
Overall -.50** -.48** .00 .00 







Study 1: Means and standard deviations of accuracy across emotions for accuracy task stimuli. 
 
Anger Fear Sadness Happiness Neutral 
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
.78a .12 .87b .11 .88b .10 .93c .07 .78a .15 






Study 1: Means and standard deviations of reaction times (ms) across emotions for accuracy task stimuli. 
 
Anger Fear Sadness Happiness Neutral 
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
1704.50a 369.54 1613.05b 434.94 1561.97b 416.30 1246.29c 271.07 1664.39ab 410.54 






Study 1: Correlations between questionnaire (BDI-II, AA) scores and indices of perceived intensity (Bias 




 BDI-II AA BDI-II AA 
Anger .32* .25 .12 .24 
Fear .27 .28 .15 .32* 
Sadness .10 .08 .08 .21 
Happiness .15 .28 .04 .14 
Overall .26 .26 .12 .27 






Study 1: Means and standard deviations of emotional intensity ratings across emotions for bias task 
stimuli. 
 
Anger Fear Sadness Happiness 
M SD M SD M SD M SD 
121.45a 22.25 123.36ab 21.93 125.98b 20.51 105.24c 13.73 







Study 1: Means and standard deviations of reaction times (ms) across emotions for bias task stimuli. 
 
Anger Fear Sadness Happiness 
M SD M SD M SD M SD 
1459.13a 505.48 1554.82b 562.01 1514.53b 485.77 1315.77c 432.66 






Study 1: Correlations between questionnaire (BDI-II, AA) scores and indices of perceived intensity 




 BDI-II AA BDI-II AA 
Anger .42** .38* .08 .22 
Fear .38** .34* .12 .28 
Sadness .15 .08 .04 .20 
Happiness .36* .38* .09 .30* 
Overall .41** .36* .10 .29 






Study 1: Means and standard deviations of emotional intensity ratings across emotions for chimera task 
stimuli. 
 
Anger Fear Sadness Happiness 
M SD M SD M SD M SD 
161.91a 29.31 156.07b 31.94 169.11c 27.41 126.61d 22.41 






Study 1: Means and standard deviations of reaction times (ms) across emotions for chimera task stimuli. 
 
Anger Fear Sadness Happiness 
M SD M SD M SD M SD 
1525.86a 525.19 1533.19a 490.94 1533.86a 505.68 1325.12b 431.86 






Study 2: Means and standard deviations of participants’ responses on the BDI-II and AA across the four 
conditions. 
 BDI-II AA 
 M SD M SD 
Rumination 12.98 7.27 30.44 10.43 
Distraction 12.56 7.20 25.70 7.43 
Cognitive Load 13.55 7.82 30.24 10.63 






Study 2: Correlations between questionnaire (BDI-II, AA) scores and indices of accuracy for each 
condition. 
 
 Rumination Distraction Cognitive Load Neutral Rumination 
 BDI-II AA BDI-II AA BDI-II AA BDI-II AA 
Anger -.23 -.23 .15 .03 -.44** -.40** .41** -.05 
Fear -.38** -.28 .28 .16 -.27 -.27 .12 -.27 
Sadness -.16 -.26 .02 -.13 -.29 -.27 .37* -.08 
Happiness -.50** -.24 .07 -.15 -.32* -.33* .19 -.13 
Neutral -.44** -.24 -.05 -.27 -.16 -.03 .05 -.13 
Overall -.52** -.37* .12 -.10 -.35* -.31* .28 -.16 







Study 2: Means and standard deviations of accuracy across emotions for accuracy task stimuli. 
 
Anger Fear Sadness Happiness Neutral 
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
.75a .15 .84b .13 .85b .14 .92c .11 .76a .17 






Study 2: Means and standard deviations of reaction times (ms) across emotions for accuracy task stimuli. 
 
Anger Fear Sadness Happiness Neutral 
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
1781.51a 523.84 1676.41b 510.32 1569.52c 405.96 1301.75d 674.49 1730.86ab 570.58 






Study 2: Means and standard deviations of accuracy across emotions for accuracy task stimuli. 
 
Anger Fear Sadness Happiness Neutral 
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
.78a .14 .85b .12 .87c .11 .93d .08 .76a .16 






Study 2: Means and standard deviations of reaction times (ms) across emotions for accuracy task stimuli. 
 
Anger Fear Sadness Happiness Neutral 
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
1817.13a 560.75 1728.53b 592.30 1640.59c 448.12 1355.74d 788.99 1820.78a 668.95 






Study 2: Correlations between questionnaire (BDI-II, AA) scores and indices of perceived intensity (Bias 
Task) for each condition. 
 
 Rumination Distraction Cognitive Load Neutral Rumination 
 BDI-II AA BDI-II AA BDI-II AA BDI-II AA 
Anger -.06 .05 -.13 .01 .05 .20 .04 .11 
Fear .00 .15 -.20 -.08 .02 .28 .04 .22 
Sadness -.04 .03 -.14 .01 .07 .26 .09 .14 
Happiness .15 .33* -.16 -.21 .30 .39* .18 .32* 
Overall .00 .15 -.19 -.07 .11 .32* .09 .22 






Study 2: Means and standard deviations of emotional intensity ratings across emotions for bias task 
stimuli. 
 
Anger Fear Sadness Happiness 
M SD M SD M SD M SD 
119.82a 22.27 120.03a 21.37 123.22b 22.09 104.46c 15.18 






Study 2: Means and standard deviations of reaction times (ms) across emotions for bias task stimuli. 
 
Anger Fear Sadness Happiness 
M SD M SD M SD M SD 
1492.92a 559.94 1550.14b 561.07 1516.50ab 518.53 1354.62c 513.15 






Study 2: Means and standard deviations of emotional intensity ratings across emotions for bias task 
stimuli. 
 
Anger Fear Sadness Happiness 
M SD M SD M SD M SD 
122.20a 20.57 123.62ab 22.48 125.61b 20.99 105.63c 13.89 






Study 2: Means and standard deviations of reaction times (ms) across emotions for bias task stimuli. 
 
Anger Fear Sadness Happiness 
M SD M SD M SD M SD 
1488.01a 491.58 1581.14b 555.39 1553.62b 501.43 1366.54c 440.66 







Study 2: Correlations between questionnaire (BDI-II, AA) scores and indices of perceived intensity 
(Chimera Task) for each condition. 
 
 Rumination Distraction Cognitive Load Neutral Rumination 
 BDI-II AA BDI-II AA BDI-II AA BDI-II AA 
Anger .12 .11 .00 .11 -.08 .28 .17 .15 
Fear .02 .06 .00 -.02 -.08 .25 .08 .32* 
Sadness .08 .02 .00 -.02 .05 .28 .02 -.05 
Happiness .18 .19 -.21 -.17 .20 .42** .22 .35* 
Overall .12 .12 -.04 .00 .01 .34* .13 .21 






Study 2: Means and standard deviations of emotional intensity ratings across emotions for chimera task 
stimuli. 
 
Anger Fear Sadness Happiness 
M SD M SD M SD M SD 
154.43a 35.14 149.86b 33.26 163.73c 31.40 121.41d 22.05 






Study 2: Means and standard deviations of reaction times (ms) across emotions for chimera task stimuli. 
 
Anger Fear Sadness Happiness 
M SD M SD M SD M SD 
1430.93a 521.69 1479.13b 484.24 1482.03b 567.81 1272.06c 389.32 






Study 2: Means and standard deviations of emotional intensity ratings across emotions for chimera task 
stimuli. 
 
Anger Fear Sadness Happiness 
M SD M SD M SD M SD 
161.78a 30.09 154.26b 31.84 170.93c 30.48 125.47d 21.94 







Study 2: Means and standard deviations of reaction times (ms) across emotions for bias task stimuli. 
 
Anger Fear Sadness Happiness 
M SD M SD M SD M SD 
1545.03a 588.30 1579.35a 538.53 1613.57b 566.60 1368.20c 493.13 










Figure 1. Schematic representation of the mediating role of rumination in the development and 
















   
 
Figure 2. Sample stimuli depicting a female target expressing an emotion (i.e., happiness) at three 








Figure 3. Sample stimuli for the Chimera task depicting a female target expressing fear in the upper half 






Figure 4. Study 1: Simple slope lines for the relationship between the type of induction received and 





















Figure 5. Study 1: Simple slope lines for the relationship between the type of induction received and 









































Figure 6. Schematic representation of the mediating role of rumination in the development and 
maintenance of depressive symptoms. The enclosed section represents the relationship of interest in 


































Figure 8. Study 2: Simple slope lines for the relationship between the type of induction (or cognitive 





















Figure 9. Study 2: Simple slope lines for the relationship between the type of induction (or cognitive 


































Figure 10. Study 2: Simple slope lines for the relationship between the type of induction received and 





















Figure 11. Study 2: Simple slope lines for the relationship between the type of induction (or cognitive 





































Figure 12. Study 2: Simple slope lines for the relationship between the type of induction (or cognitive 
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